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You-Want Pricing Contexts 
 
The dissertation explores factors influencing consumers’ payments in anonymous 
Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing contexts. Consumers often pay more than zero 
when given the opportunity to self-determine payments. However, most PWYW research 
has focused on contexts where the possibility of social influence from a salesperson or 
clerk is present.  I suggest that in anonymous exchange contexts where social pressure 
does not exist, consumers will nevertheless make voluntary payments greater than zero.  
The present research explores PWYW in anonymous purchase contexts.  Results 
from eight studies indicate that PWYW payment amounts are affected by heuristics and 
biases. In Essay 1, the influence of reference price on PWYW payments is explored. 
Firm-provided external reference prices (ERPs) framed as injunctive norms (e.g., 
suggested price) and descriptive norms (e.g., average payment) caused anchoring effects 
on voluntary payments such that those with higher ERPs reported higher payments. 
Further, ERPs framed as descriptive (vs. injunctive) norms were more predictive of 
payment amounts, but only when the ERP is high.  
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Recalling internal reference price information is more effortful than simply 
reacting to a firm-provided price.  The possibility that decreased cognitive processing 
results in higher payments, violating the concept of self-interest primacy, is explored in 
Essay 2. Four studies manipulate processing styles and demonstrate that when consumers 
use more effortful cognitive processing, they tend to make lower PWYW payments. 
These results suggest that consumers are likely to rely on a normal price heuristic when 
using more superficial processing.    
The dissertation demonstrates the importance of reference price information and 
cognitive processing styles when voluntary anonymous payments are made anonymously. 
PWYW decisions are influenced by the exchange context and how the information is 
cognitively processed. At a theoretical level, the findings demonstrate that consumers 
make voluntary payments in the absence of social pressure and that those payments can 
be predictably influenced by features in the exchange setting. Finally, the research 
suggests that consumers who exert less cognitive effort in PWYW situations make higher 
payments. It therefore appears that the first instinct is not to act self-interestedly by 
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It’s up to you. In 2007, four unexpected words posed by the alternative rock band 
Radiohead sparked a flurry of excitement in the music world. Those in the marketing 
field also took note. When fans went to buy an mp3 download of the new album In 
Rainbows, rather than a price they were confronted with this statement: It’s up to you. 
Consumers were able to report and pay any price they desired, including zero, and 
immediately download the songs. This now well-known case was a highly publicized 
example of a strategy known as Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing that allows 
consumers to select their own individual price and all buyers receive the same product, 
regardless of price paid. Though official word from the band will only say the experiment 
was “profitable,” sources report approximately 62% of buyers downloaded the album for 
free, the remaining buyers paid on average around $6.00 (average price with all buyers 
considered closer to $2.00), making In Rainbows Radiohead’s most profitable release 
ever (Pareles 2007).  
Although PWYW is not entirely new in practice, it has recently been the focus of 
an increasing amount of academic research. The defining aspects of PWYW are present 
in many real world examples, although we may not recognize them as such. Public good 
dilemmas, such as in the case of Public Broadcasting System (PBS) where all consumers 
can receive the same product regardless of payment/nonpayment and magnitude of 
payment, is similar to PWYW pricing. The strategy can be risky because it is possible 
that many or all consumers will choose to pay a price below cost or even nothing. 
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Rational choice theory, endorsed by classical economists, predicts that every consumer 
who is allowed to set a price will select zero. Even bounded rationality models that allow 
for some deviation from strict rationality would predict low or no payments in a PWYW 
context (Simon 1956). Despite the assertions of neoclassical economic theory, existing 
research from the behavioral decision making field (e.g., Camerer 1997), as well as 
dozens of real world examples, suggests that PWYW may nevertheless be a profitable 
pricing strategy.  
Technology in recent years has changed the way products are sold and consumed. 
Many products that used to be sold in tangible form are now distributed as intangible 
products – often in digital formats (e.g., music, software, applications, streaming online 
news and entertainment content, etc.). The very nature of intangible goods makes them 
particularly well suited for PWYW strategies. The incremental cost for one mp3 album 
download, for instance, is negligible and this reduces some of the risk involved with 
PWYW. When one (or many) mp3s are taken for nothing or a very low cost, profit can 
still be achieved as long as payments are on average greater than the cost of each unit 
sold. PWYW affords the possibility to collect something from those who would not 
purchase at the normal price, but still want to obtain the product and would be willing to 
pay more than zero. These new buyers may pay above the incremental cost incurred by 
the seller, though below what the normal price would have been under traditional pricing. 
Firms can realize additional value in a PWYW strategy compared to a fixed price strategy 
due to three distinct revenue sources: payments from individuals who would not purchase 
at the fixed price but still perceive value and would pay above zero, surplus payments 
from individuals paying more than the fixed price and, finally, cross selling where 
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payments are zero for the current transaction but there is an intent to purchase other 
products from the firm in the future (for a musical example, see El Harbi, Grolleau, and 
Bekir 2011). Additionally, intangible goods typically offer a limitless supply of product, 
so the potential increase in demand created through a PWYW strategy can be met by the 
firm and help ensure a profit overall.   
Often, the purchase situation for intangible products involves anonymous 
shopping. That is, the purchase is made with no interpersonal buyer-seller interaction. 
This removes the possibility of social pressure from another to pay a fair price at the time 
purchase, a feature present in most prior PWYW research.  It seems safe to assume that 
buyers pay more when they are observed or think they are being observed. For example, 
even a set of photocopied eyes on the wall has been shown to significantly increase 
payments into an “honesty box” (Bateson, Nettle and Roberts 2006).  Consequently, 
PWYW has been considered impractical for situations where the buyer does not 
exchange payment with an actual human seller (e.g. Kim, Natter, and Spann 2009). The 
assumption that consumers will not act fairly when acting anonymously is somewhat 
surprising. Many studies have demonstrated people will act fairly in cases of anonymity 
even when they have little or no rational reason to do so (e.g., Frey and Meier 2004). 
Public good dilemmas, ultimatum and dictator games clearly suggest that homo 
economicus, the mythical man always seeking to maximize utility, is a product of theory 
rather than an exemplar of real world behavior (Ariely 2009). Instead of free riding and 
zero contributions, people do make contributions to shared public goods and anonymous 
partners. Without social pressure, the buyer may face self-inflicted pressure related to 
impression management. The buyer is still sending a signal to the self whether or not 
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there is a seller physically taking the payment. The desire to appear to the self as a good 
and fair person can be a strong motivator to act commensurately (Dunning 2007).  
 The purchase contexts selected for the current dissertation include intangible 
products paid for anonymously. Not only are these types of products better suited for 
PWYW from a cost structure perspective (unlimited supply and small incremental cost), 
they also represent business categories currently adapting to changing consumption 
patterns (music, journalism). Because adopting a PWYW strategy is risky for firms, it is 
important to explore the factors that influence payment amounts, particularly those under 
the control of the firm. In addition to practical applications, this research will extend 
knowledge in consumer decision making. The dissertation explores heuristics and biases 
in PWYW decision making. Specifically, essay 1 explores the anchoring heuristic and 
essay 2 tests for dual processing effects on PWYW payments. That is, essay 2 
investigates dual processing and its connection to self-interest and justice motivations, as 
well as heuristic-based decision making in a PWYW context.  
 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
A total of eight studies comprise the two essays that follow. In all studies, it was 
expected that consumers would report paying more than zero on average in a PWYW 
setting. In the first essay, four studies are described exploring how heuristics and biases 
affect PWYW payment amounts. Because determining a PWYW amount is a decision 
made under uncertainty, it is likely to be affected by heuristics and biases (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974). Specifically, the studies explore anchoring and adjustment effects 
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based on numeric information presented in a PWYW context. Also tested is the extent to 
which normative framing (i.e., descriptive vs. injunctive) of numeric anchors affects 
PWYW payments. The second essay details four studies which explore the relationship 
between dual processing and justice vs. self-interest motivations in determining PWYW 
payment amounts.  
 
Essay 1 
In studies 1 and 2, it is hypothesized that externally provided numeric information 
will have an anchoring effect on PWYW payment amounts. Higher (vs. lower) face value 
numbers provided immediately before or during the purchase are expected to elicit higher 
PWYW payments. Additionally, study 2 tests for the relative influence of numbers 
framed as either descriptive or injunctive norms. Descriptive norms are expected to be 
more predictive of PWYW payments. Study 3 considers the anchoring effects of 
company-set minimum and maximum constraints on voluntary payments. It is expected 
that implementing a minimum payment above zero will decrease average payments 
relative to a true PWYW (no constraint) context. Additionally, implementing a maximum 
constraint, or capping payments, will increase average payments, a result which may be 
counterintuitive from a business perspective. The final study tests for anchoring effects of 
self-generated price information on PWYW payments. Internal reference prices (vs. 
externally provided numbers) are hypothesized to influence PWYW payments through 




TABLE 1  
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 1-4: ESSAY 1 
Essay 1 Description  Context Manipulations 
Study 1 Normal Price CLOUDX ERP
*
(not present, low ($9.99), high ($24.99) 




Norm Frame (injunctive, descriptive) x  
ERP (not present, low ($9.99), high ($24.99)) 
Study 3  Constraining PWYW Mp3  Constraint (none, minimum ($2), maximum ($25))   
Study 4 Internal Reference Price  CLOUDX IRP† (Charge and Worth) x  
ERP (Low ($2-$4), High $8-$16))  
*External Reference Price 
†Internal Reference Price 
 
Studies 1-3 considered PWYW effects elicited by external reference prices 
(ERPs) provided by the firm, which can take several forms. Participants in study 1 were 
given a high (vs. low) price that the company would charge under a traditional pricing 
strategy (referred to as a “normal” price). A normal price suggests an injunctive norm 
because it indicates what the company believes the consumer ought to pay. Study 2 tested 
the effects of framing numbers as descriptive and injunctive norms. Descriptive norms 
provide the consumer with information about what others are doing. Specifically, study 2 
explored how ERPs presented as the “average” price paid by others affect PWYW 
payments.  
Study 3 provided a test of a third form of numeric information. Numbers provided 
in this study did not represent normative framing information per se. Rather, low anchor 
conditions were expressed as a minimum payment allowed and high anchors were set as a 
maximum payment allowed, in contrast to a true PWYW condition with no minimum or 
maximum restrictions. It was expected that setting maximums will increase payment 
amounts via a subtle anchoring effect that is independent of injunctive norm framing. 
Low minimums were expected to result in lower payments due to anchoring on a low 
value and the use of a default setting. Although these restraints on payment amounts 
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technically violate true PWYW, it is a technique often used in business practice. Firms 
implement PWYW minimums to protect themselves from the risk of very low or zero 
payments, but minimums are herein demonstrated to have a negative effect on payments 
overall.  
The fourth and final study in essay 1 was developed to test whether self-generated 
internal reference prices (IRPs) may also have an anchoring effect on PWYW payments. 
IRPs are separate from any external information given by the seller and refer to price 
information an individual has prior to the actual purchase based both on expectations and 
prior purchases (Mayhew and Winer 1992). It is possible that IRPs, once called to mind 
and reported, act as anchors in a manner similar to that of ERPs. Another possibility is 
that the process of calling to mind an IRP engages a different processing system that 
supersedes anchoring effects. When consumers engage in more rational and calculated 
processing, they may be more likely to act out of self-interest by paying less. Such a 




Essay 2 was developed to further explore the role of cognitive effort in PWYW 
contexts suggested by findings from study 4. It has been suggested that people use a dual 
processing system when making decisions (Kahneman 2011). System 1 is an automatic 
and intuitive process that is in control of judgments, decisions and behaviors most of the 
time. However, when a decision is important or complex, the more rational and effortful 
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System 2 processing style is engaged. Individuals making quick decisions using System 1 
processing are thought to act more selfishly due to the primacy of the self-interest 
motivate (Moore and Loewenstein 2004). This suggests that justice and fairness concerns 
become salient only when self-interest is actively suppressed, such as when System 2 
processing is engaged.  However, although counterintuitive, it is also possible that the 
opposite is true. Recent work by Rand, Greene and Nowak (2012) indicates that quick 
decisions tend to be more generous in economic games. Further, Zaki and Mitchell 
(2013) describe new evidence that prosocial behavior may be intuitive. It may be that 
reliance on System 1 processing will elicit higher PWYW payments. The reason for this 
is that given an unusual decision, such as deciding how much to pay in a PWYW context, 
the consumer may experience uncertainty. Uncertainty may lead the consumer to rely on 
heuristic-based decision making. In a PWYW context, the most accessible information to 
use in determining payment is likely to be the expected normal price. This would suggest 
that less cognitive effort could yield higher PWYW payments. Essay 2 tests for this 
counterintuitive idea.    
In essay 2, the somewhat surprising possibility that those relying on System 1 
processing when determining payment amounts tend to pay more than those using 
System 2 processing is explored. The possibility that the first instinct in PWYW is to pay 
more is very curious because people are thought to be fundamentally self-interested. 
Additionally, studies herein explore whether increasing the salience of fairness may have 
a positive effect on voluntary payments. Essay 2 is comprised of four studies that test the 
role of dual processing and its effects on PWYW payments. Please see table 2 for an 




OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 1-4: ESSAY 2 
Essay 1 Dual Processing 
Manipulation Type 
Context Manipulations 
Study 1 Recalling IRP CLOUDX Fairness (salient, control) x  
IRP Type (control, low, high) 
Study 2 Cognitive Load CLOUDX Fairness (altruistic, egotistic, control) x  
Load (high, low) 
Study 3 Elaboration Type CLOUDX POV (self, firm) x Elaboration Type (increase, 
decrease, neutral) + control 
Study 4 Time Constraints CLOUDX ERP (control, low, high) x  
Constraint (control, long, short) 
 
In the final study of the first essay which informed study 1 in essay 2, participants 
were asked to provide two pieces of internal reference price (IRP) information. First, they 
were asked to provide estimates of what they thought the company would charge for the 
service. Second, they were asked to indicate how much they personally thought the 
service was worth. In the first study of essay 2, these two elements are separated on a 
between-subjects basis. Considered here is that, regardless of recalled IRP amount, the 
act of reporting a self-generated value will lead to lower PWYW payments. IRPs were 
not expected to be a particularly effective anchor because of their rather vague nature. 
Thus, rather than IRPs causing anchoring effects on payments, exerting the effort to 
report IRP information may cause more engaged consumers to act self-interestedly. If 
cognitive effort level is increased, it is possible that System 2 processing will lead 
consumers to make lower PWYW payments.  
The nature of cognitive processing in the context of PWYW is further explored in 
the final three studies of essay 2. In study 2 of this essay, processing style was 
manipulated using a cognitive load procedure. System 2 processing should lead to lower 
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PWYW amounts if the availability of greater cognitive resources leads to more deliberate 
thinking about one’s own self interests in selecting an amount to pay.  On the other hand, 
those processing with System 1 (e.g., under high cognitive load) are likely to make less 
effortful decisions guided by heuristic-based decision making. In a PWYW context, the 
automatic choice may be to pay the expected normal price.    
In study 3 processing style was manipulated by utilizing an elaboration task. 
Some participants were asked to imagine themselves as the buyer and others acted as 
employees for the company considering PWYW implementation. Additionally, 
participants were randomly assigned to either think about and explain why one would pay 
a fair/high amount or nothing/very low amounts. I suspected that those elaborating will 
make lower PWYW payments compared to a group that does not elaborate.  
The final study in essay 2 used a third dual processing manipulation designed to 
extend the previous studies. Importantly, the study also explored the reason why System 
1 elicits higher PWYW payments. Processing style was manipulated using time 
constraints that required participants to make either fast or slow decisions. Although 
System 1 leads to higher payments, this does not necessarily indicate that self-interest has 
been suppressed in favor of acting fairly. It is hypothesized that higher payments are the 
result of System 1 heuristic-based decision making, whereas lower payments resulting 




ESSAY 1: PLEASE PAY WHAT IS SUGGESTED: 




 The first essay explores anchoring and normative framing effects in an 
anonymous Pay-What-You-Want pricing context. In order to reduce the financial risk of 
implementing a PWYW strategy, firms must understand the manner and extent to which 
numeric information and its meaning affect payments. Extending what is known about 
willing-to-pay prices to a context where consumers have complete control of price setting 
will advance understanding of heuristics and biases in a unique consumer context. Also, 
testing for these effects in an anonymous context will provide insights into the feasibility 
of PWYW pricing in online shopping. Research suggests that the anonymity of payments 
does not preclude buyers from paying something (León, Noguera, and Tena-Sánchez 
2012) and that traditional anchoring effects hold in a participative pricing context 
(Johnson and Chu 2012). Additionally, numeric information (e.g., suggested prices, 
normal prices, etc.) in PWYW purchase contexts can represent different types of 
normative information, providing insight into what one should or is expected to do 
(injunctive norms) or about what others are doing (descriptive norms).  Differences in 
effect sizes between normative information frames both will guide practitioners in 
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PWYW implementation and extend our understanding of consumer conformity to norms. 
The current research explores judgments and decisions in a PWYW context that may 
provide insight into more widely applicable knowledge about basic human motivations.  
 Next, an overview of existing research related to the first essay is provided. 
Participative pricing as well as PWYW studies are reviewed. An introduction to framing 
and anchoring as it relates to the current context is provided. Because different frames of 
numeric information are expected to influence judgments and decisions in various ways, 
several concepts which are expected to influence payments are reviewed. Research on 
external and internal reference prices is outlined. Also, the theoretical foundation for the 
influence of different types of normative information, specifically injunctive and 
descriptive norms, is discussed. Six hypotheses related to the effects of ERPs on PWYW 
payments are derived. The following section describes four studies that test these 
hypotheses. Finally, questions stemming from expected results of the final study are 
posed and possible explanations are suggested. These questions form the basis for future 




Most extant marketing research in the pricing domain focuses on either how firms 
set prices or how consumers react to prices. Marketing strategy research in pricing 
focuses on one of the most complex and critically important marketing decisions a firm 
makes - how much to price its products (Monroe 1990).  Traditionally, a firm determines 
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the price to charge by considering cost structures, competitor prices, and desired profit 
levels (Tellis 1986). Occasionally, a firm will consider the psychological influences 
prices can have on consumers as well. Alternatively, consumer behavior research 
investigates how consumers form judgments about prices (good/bad, fair/unfair, etc.) and 
the resulting action (buy/not buy; Lui and Soman 2008). Another important measure for 
pricing researchers is willingness-to-pay (WTP), which is defined as the dollar amount 
above which the consumer would decide not to buy (Monroe 1973). The same explicit 
price can be perceived and judged differently because consumers have idiosyncratic 
reactions to prices based on individual differences, contexts, product types, information 
availability, experience and a host of other variables (Monroe 1973). The vast majority of 
pricing research is situated inside a model assuming the firm as price setter and consumer 
as acceptor/rejecter. 
 A smaller body of research focuses on consumer behavior related to more 
creative pricing tactics such as dynamic and participative pricing mechanisms. Research 
in this domain still mainly centers on economic models, rather than on the psychological 
reactions and outcomes. Dynamic pricing, also known as individual-level price 
discrimination, refers to tactics where prices vary over time, across consumers, and/or 
circumstances (Haws and Bearden 2006). These tactics are becoming more prevalent due 
to easier online implementation (Kannan and Kopalle 2001) and can be beneficial to both 
firms and consumers, but can also be viewed quite negatively by consumers because of 
fairness concerns over charging different prices to different consumers (Haws and 
Bearden 2006). Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) is an example of dynamic pricing in that 
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each consumer pays a different price, although consumers are less likely to be concerned 
about fairness since buyers are setting their own prices.  
Participative pricing strategies are defined as those giving the consumer some 
measure of control in price determination and include such tactics as auctions, 
negotiations, reverse pricing and name-your-price (NYOP) models (Chandran and 
Morowitz 2006). There is scant research on how involvement in price setting affects 
consumer behavior. Chandran and Morowitz (2006) suggest that some facets of consumer 
behavior are different in participative pricing contexts compared with traditional pricing, 
most notably increased purchase intent in participative scenarios due to high perceived 
personal control. Differences between participative pricing strategies allow for different 
levels of uncertainty and effort. For example, an auction normally has a starting point (as 
well as often having a ceiling or “buy it now” price), and bids can be made repeatedly. 
However, in a NYOP scenario (e.g., Priceline.com), there may not be any available 
pricing information and once the buyer’s offer is rejected, the purchase cannot be made. 
In most participative pricing scenarios the buyer is incentivized to offer an amount close 
to their individual WTP price as the seller still has the option to reject the offer. PWYW 
is an extreme form of participative pricing where control resides solely with the buyer. 
Complete control over price may at least partially remove the incentive to pay up to WTP 
as consumers will receive the product regardless of the amount paid. The current research 
explores how what is known about consumers’ psychological and behavioral reactions to 
prices in traditional settings applies to PWYW pricing where consumers assume sole 





Kim et al. (2009) define PWYW pricing as a purchase situation where the buyer 
selects any price at or above zero for a product and the seller must accept. The consumer 
decision making process is quite different from a traditional pricing context. Normally, a 
consumer’s fundamental decision is whether to buy or not buy. In PWYW, the consumer 
has to select a payment amount from a theoretically infinite span of choices. Neoclassical 
economic theory has a very simple prediction for behavior in this case. Value, in the 
financial sense, is maximized when the consumer takes the product for free. To do 
otherwise would go against rational choice theory. Of course, consumers are not 
necessarily rational decision makers and they often violate economic theory (Ariely 
2009; Poundstone 2010).  Although paying something when giving the choice to pay 
nothing may appear illogical, empirical research may help explain why consumers choose 
to pay in PWYW contexts.   
Published research in PWYW pricing has found that, on average, consumers pay 
more than nothing in both hypothetical and experimental scenarios (Jang and Chu 2012; 
Johnson and Cui 2013; Mak, Zwick, and Rao 2010; Schmidt, Spann and Zeithammer 
2012) as well as in field studies where actual payments were made (Borck, Frank and 
Robledo 2006; Gautier and van der Klaauw 2012; Gneezy, Gneezy, Nelson, and Brown 
2010; Gneezy, Gneezy, Riener, and Nelson 2012; Kim et al. 2009; León, Noguera, and 
Tena-Sánchez 2012; Lynn 1990; Regner and Barria 2009; Riener and Traxler 2012). The 
majority of PWYW research has included face-to-face interaction contexts.  Kim et al. 
(2009) claim that personal interaction is important for the business feasibility of a 
PWYW model, in spite of numerous successful real-world impersonal business examples, 
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such as the Radiohead In Rainbows album download. Products and services where 
transactions are not “face-to-face” often represent contexts where PWYW pricing may be 
less risky to a firm and more profitable. Examples include online distribution of music, 
electronic books, applications and software and other intangible informational and 
entertainment content. Although Kim et al. (2009) purposefully select products where the 
financial exchange is person to person, they also explain the selected contexts used in 
their studies (buffet lunches, hot beverages and movie tickets) are appropriate due to 
“high fixed costs but low variable costs.”  
Similarly, Johnson and Cui (2013) ask participants to imagine speaking with a 
box office employee and verbally reporting the price they would like to pay. The 
hypothetical personal interaction forces a social element even though most consumers 
would be more likely to purchase the ticket online. In fact, in a pretest with a similar 
population run for the research proposed herein, 92% of consumers reported they would 
most likely buy a concert ticket online and only 2% reported that they would call a venue 
to purchase a concert ticket. It would appear that many past researchers have assumed 
that payments in PWYW contexts are dependent on a personal interaction, yet this may 
actually not be the case. The present research seeks to replicate the basic finding that 
consumers will pay more than zero in PWYW and to generalize the findings to a context 
without personal interaction during the financial transaction. Accordingly, the first 
hypothesis posits: 
H1: Anonymous PWYW payments are greater than zero on average. 
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To predict that there will be some level of payment in anonymous PWYW 
contexts is only a first step. There are a multitude of factors that may affect payment 
levels.  Although studies have found positive payment amounts, significant differences in 
average payments have been demonstrated based on various manipulations and individual 
differences. The reader is referred to table 1 for an overview of extent PWYW pricing 
research.  
TABLE 1 
 OVERVIEW OF PWYW STUDIES AND FINDINGS 
Authors Type Product 
Context 
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Table 1. (continued).  
Authors Type Product 
Context 






















































Meals Yes (4 
choices for 
prices) 
Interpersonal Server Identity 
Party Size 

























Meals No  Interpersonal Mood (Weather) 
Number of customers 
 
*Bolded factors were found to be significant predictors of price paid in PWYW contexts in at least some 
conditions.  
 
Factors such as fairness, reciprocity, loyalty, guilt, altruism, frames, reference 
prices, personal income, nationality, gender, satisfaction, price consciousness, charitable 
giving/prosocial motives, self-signaling, social pressures, internal and external reference 
prices have all been identified and/or investigated as predictors of PWYW payment 
magnitudes. Between product contexts within studies and across researchers, findings on 
the influences of different factors on PWYW payments have been mixed. Other 
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researchers featured in the table speculate on influences without testing them empirically 
or rely on anecdotal evidence only.  
What is clear from past research is that buyers will pay something when given the 
option to pay nothing and that various factors appear to influence the amount paid. The 
explanations and interpretations of why consumers pay different amounts in PWYW are 
less clear. There is substantial variation regarding which factors are selected for study and 
how these factors are measured and/or manipulated across studies. Some factors 
predicted to influence payments are merely conceptual and speculative; others have been 
measured and/or manipulated in questionable ways. The first essay of this dissertation 
focuses on factors that have been demonstrated in traditional pricing contexts to 1) 
influence WTP prices and 2) can be controlled by the firm. Past research has 
demonstrated that consumers’ perceptions and acceptance of prices are influenced by a 
firm’s decisions. The present research investigates whether voluntary PWYW payments 
are also subject to firm influence.  
Any payment in PWYW deviates from rational choice theory.  Therefore, it 
makes it worth investigating how a firm might influence the factors which may predict 
how much is paid. Decisions about how much to pay in a PWYW exchange may be quite 
difficult because such exchanges are currently unexpected and novel to most consumers. 
When consumers are faced with determining a payment amount, there is inherent 
uncertainty about what the right thing to do is, what others may do in the same situation 
and what the best payment amount might be. Two important elements of choice 
presentation that have been demonstrated to influence decisions made under uncertainty 
are externally provided numeric information (anchoring and adjustment) and the way in 
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which the question is asked (framing; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982).  The 
following section will review the literature in each area and introduce related hypotheses 
for their application to PWYW scenarios.   
Anchoring and Adjustment 
Anchoring is considered a heuristic decision making tool that leads to bias 
because individuals’ responses are systematically and predictably influenced by available 
numeric information (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). In order to reach a decision, 
consumers “anchor on,” or begin with, a piece of available information and then progress 
up or down until a plausible or acceptable value is reached (Slovic and Lichenstein 
1971). These adjustments to the “correct” level are normally insufficient because the 
decision maker stops as soon as the value is within an acceptable range rather than 
continuing to adjust to the correct value (Epley and Gilovich 2006).  
In a traditional pricing context, a seller provides the consumer with a price that is 
then compared to an expected price. A decision is then made about whether or not to buy 
the product at that price. Rather than deciding to buy or not in a PWYW context, a 
consumer must now determine how much to pay. Choosing a price is a novel and perhaps 
confusing situation. When people face uncertain decisions, anchoring and adjustment is a 
mental strategy relied upon to reduce cognitive effort (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
People are only able to devote a limited amount of energy to any given decision. 
Anchoring is a tool that reduces time and cognitive effort (Hastie and Dawes 2009). 
However, anchoring can result in biased or non-optimal decisions (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974).   
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Anchoring is a phenomenon that has been demonstrated across multiple contexts 
featuring uncertainty such as courtroom decisions (Chapman and Bornstein 1996; 
Malouff and Schutte 1989), real estate transactions (Northcraft and Neale 1987), health 
and diagnosis decisions (Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz, and Bergus 2007), and lab 
estimation tasks (see Chapman and Johnson 1994, for review). For example, when asked 
to estimate the population of Chicago, most people have a vague idea of an estimate 
rather than a precise number. When first asked whether the population is less than or 
greater than 200,000, people tend to report lower estimates compared to those who are 
first presented with less than or greater to 5 million (Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995). 
Anchoring explains how estimates and preferences are unduly influenced by initial 
impressions, perceptions and, in the present case most importantly, values (Chapman and 
Johnson 1999; Epley and Gilovich 2006). Wilson, Houston, Etling, and Brekke (1996) 
reported that anchoring effects are observed even when a number is not informative of 
the estimate. These effects are unconscious and difficult to suppress even when one is 
forewarned about anchoring biases. Even when incentivized to make accurate judgments, 
anchoring effects remain (Brewer et al. 2007; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Wilson et al. 
1996).  
In a pricing context, anchoring is an important heuristic to consider because prices 
are by nature numeric information that consumers may anchor on to determine WTP and 
quality. Given that determining a product’s value and making a decision about WTP is a 
challenging task that involves a numerical estimation, it is not surprising that anchoring 
effects are present in a purchasing context. Rather than having stable price information 
about how much products are worth, consumers construct preferences within the 
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purchase context (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Consumers do not have a specific 
preexisting expected and acceptable price for many products. Instead, there is an 
acceptable range, which may be quite large given uncertainty about the product’s value 
(Drolet, Simonson and Tversky 2000). Simonson and Drolet (2004) found that anchors 
affect WTP with stronger effects being reported when buyers felt more uncertainty about 
the exchange. Even prices that are completely unrelated to the immediate purchase have 
shown anchoring effects on WTP (Nunes and Boatwright 2004).  
External Reference Prices 
 In a PWYW context, a consumer determines a voluntary price to pay rather than 
simply accepting or rejecting a price. A first step in exploring how consumers select 
PWYW prices is to test whether cognitive strategies used to evaluate prices in traditional 
pricing contexts also apply to a self-selected payment. According to Monroe (1979), one 
of the most critical factors influencing product judgment and purchase is the price. 
Research suggests that consumers first make a judgment about the value of the offer (the 
subjective value of the product at that price point) and then decide the action to take. 
According to adaptation-level theory, all encountered stimuli are judged against an 
expected level (Helson 1948). In a pricing context, consumers use reference prices as a 
basis for making judgments and decisions about products (Kalyanaram and Winer 1995; 
Monroe 1979). When exposed to a price, a consumer automatically compares it to a 
reference price when assessing whether it is “good” or acceptable and whether or not to 
make the purchase (Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha 2005). A reference price is a combination 
of internal and external information (Mazumdar et al. 2005). Reference prices have also 
been shown to influence consumers’ WTP amounts for products (Mazumdar et al. 2005) 
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such that consumers exposed to higher reference price information report higher WTP 
amounts.  
There are generally two types of reference prices: external reference price (ERP) 
and internal reference price (IRP) (Kalyanaram and Winer 1995). Both can be used as a 
context for current price evaluation (Liu and Soman 2006). ERPs are defined as any price 
information that is presented during the purchase occasion, such as the original price for 
an item that has been marked down or an advertised competitor’s price (Mayhew and 
Winer 1992). IRPs exist in a consumer’s mind prior to purchase and must be recalled 
during the purchase occasion (Klein and Oglethorpe 1987). ERPs can be presented in a 
myriad of ways. An ERP presentation particularly suited for PWYW pricing contexts is a 
stated normal price. A normal price refers to how much the firm would normally charge 
for the product or service. 
Consumers often use ERPs as anchors (Mazumdar et al. 2005). When a company 
provides an ERP in the form of an original price (i.e., a listed price for the product that 
has been reduced), the consumer begins with that value and then adjusts it until an 
acceptable price is reached. In a PWYW context, the effect of ERP and anchoring on 
payments has received some attention with research results being mixed. Recent research 
suggests that although firms may be able to influence PWYW payments by providing 
ERPs, the presence of an ERP whether low or high may reduce payments overall 
(Johnson and Cui 2013). Johnson and Cui do not offer an explanation for why consumers 
are sometimes willing to pay more for something in the absence of numeric information. 
The idea that ERPs may suppress payment is worthy of further study.  Regner and Barria 
(2009) also found evidence of anchoring effects of a suggested price on prices paid. At 
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the beginning of data collection on album sales, the suggested price was of the same face 
value magnitude irrespective of currency (Americans saw $8, English saw £8, Germans 
saw €8). When the website corrected this by lowering the Euro and Pound suggested 
prices to reflect the actual value, a corresponding drop in payment amounts was 
observed.  
Along similar lines, Gautier and van der Klaauw (2010) tested for normal price 
ERP anchoring effects. They found that increasing the stated normal price of a hotel 
room by €20 increased PWYW payments significantly (on average around €11) for 
consumers who did not know about the PWYW pricing until after booking. However, the 
change in ERP did not affect payments for the consumers who were aware of the PWYW 
promotion when they booked their stay. Consumers who booked rooms knowing they 
would determine their price were not influenced by an increased normal price, suggesting 
that this group was somehow able to resist an anchoring effect of normal price. The fact 
that these consumers also paid significantly less than those making reservations without 
the PWYW incentive at the time of booking indicates that consumers who seek out 
PWYW products may be more motivated by getting a deal and able to resist an anchoring 
bias.  
There is also evidence that a posted normal price may not act as an anchor and 
may even have a negative effect on PWYW payment amounts. For example, bagel buyers 
paying into an “honesty box” lowered their payments in response to increases in posted 
prices (Levitt 2006). In this type of scenario, buyers are provided with prices and trusted 
to put their payments in the “honesty box.” It may be that the increased posted price was 
enough for non-payers to incur a negative moral cost associated with taking the bagel for 
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free because the honesty box has a stronger norm-based component than PWYW. When 
the cost of doing the right thing (e.g., paying the normal price) increases, compliance 
becomes more expensive and the temptation to succumb to self-interest is increased.    
Johnson and Cui (2013) found anchoring effects on prices paid for firm set 
minimum and maximum prices. Participants paid more when given higher (vs. lower) 
maximum prices. The same pattern was found for low and high minimum prices.  
Johnson and Cui found a similar effect for what they describe as “suggested” prices, 
which were operationalized as the amount paid by most people. Payment amounts were 
influenced by ERPs, yet ERPs reduce payment amounts relative to control conditions 
where price information is not provided. These studies can be criticized because rather 
than testing high and low ERPs that represent mere suggestions, a minimum and a 
maximum price was enforced, thus violating the concept of PWYW where the consumer 
has complete freedom to pay any price. It would have been more informative to test low 
and high ERPs in a manner that allows consumers to retain full price determination, 
rather than using ERPs as floor and ceiling payment levels. Nevertheless, the studies 
provide insight into how anchoring may operate in PWYW contexts. The reported 
findings also suggest that not only the face value of the ERP matters, but what that 
number represents may have effects on the size of an anchoring effect such that an ERP 
may be overridden, decreased or amplified depending on what the number represents to 
the consumer.   
Different presentations of information can influence choice and judgment 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981), thus it useful to replicate using ERPs with different 
meanings. Three presentations of ERP information will be explored to test anchoring 
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effects in the current essay. The first is a simple normal price given by the firm. When a 
firm informs the consumer of what it would normally charge or has charged in the past, 
that information should act as an anchor. It is expected that PWYW payments will move 
closer to the anchor based on previous findings in other contexts (e.g., Drolet and 
Simonson 2004). A suggested price presentation is also tested where the ERP is given as 
a price that the firm suggests the consumer should pay. A final presentation of company-
provided ERP tested for anchoring effects when information about how much other 
consumers have paid was provided. All presentations are expected to result in payments 
anchored on the ERP. Formally:   
H2: Anonymous PWYW payments will be influenced by external reference price 
information. Individuals exposed to higher (vs. lower) ERPs presented as either a 
(a) normal price, (b) “suggested” price or (c) average other’s payment will be 
greater.  
It may be that consumers cannot help but be influenced by numeric information, 
no matter how it is presented. All ERPs may simply act as a “default” (Ariely 2009) and 
consumers may be more apt to select the precise suggested price because it is cognitively 
easier than coming up with their own price. However, it is also may be that depending on 
the presentation, the influence of the ERP on PWYW payments may vary. The possibility 
that the framing, or meaning of the number, affects payments above face value of the 






 According to Amos Tversky, “We choose between descriptions of options, rather 
than between the options themselves” (1996). Framing is defined as the manner in which 
a choice problem or statement is presented (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). One clue that 
humans are prone to irrationality is the existence of preference reversals. Judgments, 
decisions and choices are surprisingly malleable depending on the decision frame, with 
seemingly trivial differences causing significant shifts in preferences (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981; 1986). For example, if choice options are framed as a gain, people tend 
to act in a more risk averse manner. Conversely, an identical option framed as a loss 
causes greater risk seeking. Effects have been demonstrated in choice sets, both 
hypothetical and real, across varied contexts such as medical decisions and financial 
gambles. Research has also found framing effects in marketing contexts (Campbell 2007; 
Chakravarti, Krish, Paul, and Srivastava 2002; Green and Blair 1995; Heyman and 
Mellers 2006; Stone, Yates and Parker 1994). In fact, promotion and marketing 
communications often capitalize on framing effects when presenting products and/or 
information to consumers. Over the past thirty years, the definition of framing has been 
widely expanded from Tversky and Kahneman’s original definition. (See Levin, 
Schneider and Gaeth (1998) for an overview and typology of expanded types of framing 
effects.)  
 There is some evidence that presentation choices influence PWYW payments. 
Consider the case study of “El trato” (“the deal” in Spanish) in which a Spanish travel 
agency, Atrápalo, offered trip packages under PWYW conditions (León et al. 2012). 
Although buyers paid greater than nothing on average, the payments for these big ticket 
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items were very small (a mere 5.1% of market value overall). Additionally, a large 
portion of individuals paid nothing (46.5%) which is much larger compared to PWYW 
findings from laboratory settings and other field studies.  Although low payments may 
indicate that PWYW is not as financially feasible as some empirical findings suggest, 
there is an alternative explanation. Based on qualitative analysis, the authors suggest that 
framing of the promotional campaign leading up to El trato combined with the wording 
of the payment exchange were responsible for the low payments. The authors speculate 
that having customers “grab” a very limited quantity of deals made them feel like they 
had won a prize rather than purchased something. Other promotional communications 
made consumers feel like the campaign was a stunt intended not to generate profit, but 
intended instead to generate publicity. The framing choices made by Atrápalo’s 
marketing agents who described El trato may have inadvertently encouraged lower 
payments.   
In PWYW situations, consumers are making decisions about how much to pay for 
a good in an unconstrained manner. This does not mean, however, that the firm cannot 
influence payments based on how information is framed. One factor that can easily be 
manipulated and has been demonstrated to affect WTP is numeric information. The same 
face value numeric information may have disparate effects on payments depending on 
how it is framed. Therefore, a competitor’s price may have a differential effect on price 
paid than a suggested price of the same magnitude because of the meaning associated 
with the number.  Firms have control over the manner in which PWYW pricing is 
presented to consumers. Making framing choices involves not only how to frame 
information, but also what type of information to provide or exclude. Price information 
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such as a normal price, competitors’ prices, suggested prices and the price others have 
paid are all commonly encountered ERPs that may influence subsequent PWYW 
payments.  
The preceding suggests that the same number may have different effects on 
payments depending on the meaning of that number. To state that all ERPs act as anchors 
may be too simplistic. Anchoring effects should be tested with numeric presentations that 
have different meanings. The manner in which the ERP is framed is expected to influence 
the size of the anchoring effect. Presentation effects may be particularly problematic in 
the case of Johnson and Cui’s research because what they refer to as “suggested price” is 
actually information about average payments. This may be viewed as a social cue or 
normative information. A firm generated “suggested price” may have a different impact 
on payments compared to beliefs about the payments of what others are making. 
Information about others’ payments is a descriptive norm (what other people are doing) 
and a suggested price from the company is an injunctive norm (what “ought” to be done; 
Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990). Research shows that when these two types of norms 
are in conflict, descriptive norms are more predictive of behavior (Bicchieri and Xiao 
2009; Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990), which suggests that framing an ERP as a 
descriptive norm may result in a stronger anchoring effect. Predictions regarding norm 
frames are discussed in more depth subsequently.  
The Influence of Normative Information 
Yet another difference in what price might be paid for something is when external 
reference price information originates from other consumers rather than the firm. Rather 
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than acting as an anchor, a price stated to be an “average person’s” payment represents a 
descriptive norm that capitalizes on social influence. Behavioral economics research 
suggests that the influence of social norm information may have a stronger influence than 
information originating from the firm (Bicchieri and Xiao 2009). What people think 
about others’ actions, as well as their thoughts about how others view them, may be 
especially relevant to PWYW payments. PWYW contexts often include the presence of 
others. Also, consumers are often required in these contexts to announce their payment 
decisions to a company employee. Another source of social influence in these contexts is 
knowledge or beliefs about what others are paying (i.e., descriptive norm beliefs). Given 
that impression management concerns one’s desire to maintain a positive image to others 
as well as to the self, it would not be surprising that social norms affect payment 
decisions in PWYW contexts. In PWYW contexts, others may exert unintended pressure 
to pay a price deemed to be “fair” as well as provide information about what the right 
thing to do is (i.e., set descriptive norms).  
Whereas fairness concerns are motivated by injunctive norms (ought to pay), 
social cues serve as descriptive norms because they provide information on what others 
are doing (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990). If true, then prices paid should be higher 
in the presence of others. Even in the absence of others during payment, information 
about how much others paid should influence payment amounts because descriptive 
norms have been shown to influence individual behavior in other contexts (Bicchieri and 
Xiao 2009).  
 Impression management is a concern in any context where consumers are (or are 
imagining) paying an actual person or paying in the presence of others rather than 
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engaging in an anonymous transaction.  Therefore, almost all previous PWYW research 
is confounded with impression management as most research contexts have featured 
face-to-face interactions. Removing social interaction will allow for a test of whether 
social cues that are not delivered through the physical presence of others influence 
payment amounts. It should be noted that anonymous transactions only remove concern 
for social impression management but does not address self-impression management 
concerns that may be a potentially important factor in payment amounts. This will be 
explored later in this dissertation.  
 An intriguing finding related to impression management is the souvenir photo 
field experiment by Gneezy et al. (2010) where PWYW significantly increased purchase 
rates relative to traditional pricing. In the experiment, half the respondents were told that 
they could pay any price they wanted, including zero, for a photo (i.e., true PWYW).  
Respondents in another condition could also pay any price they wanted, but also 50% of 
their payment would be donated to charity (PWYW + charity).  Respondents in the 
PWYW + charity condition were essentially getting a better deal because not only would 
they receive the photo, but they would also be donating to charity, the presence of the 
charity appeal suppressed purchase rate. The authors suggested that consumers want to 
pay very low PWYW prices, but would feel bad if they paid very little when the charity 
appeal was attached. Consumers would forgo the purchase altogether rather than either 
voluntarily paying the ethically “fair” high price or incurring negative feelings about their 
behavior by paying a low price. The presence of the charity appeal made those who 
would pay a low amount under strictly PWYW refrain from the purchase in order to 
maintain their self and social image. The study results begin to explain how impression 
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management affects PWYW payment amounts.  However, the conditions included in this 
study may be confounded by social impression management related to reporting 
payments to actual employees and by making the purchase in the presence of a tightly 
bound social group that most likely included family and friends.  
Further exploring the influence of others in PWYW contexts, Lynn (1990) found 
that when paying for meals after consumption, the price selected was not influenced by 
the number of diners at the table despite the author’s prediction that consumers would 
pay more than necessary in order to avoid appearing cheap. Instead, Lynn found that 
server identity was a significant predictor of payment amounts. Lynn interpreted these 
findings as suggesting that consumers cared more about impressing certain servers, 
perhaps due to the server’s attractiveness or ability to intimidate.  
In many cases, social and self-impression management are inextricably linked. If 
one takes a friend out for dinner at a PWYW restaurant, the price paid sends a signal to 
the friend as well as to the self. When paying anonymously in a PWYW scenario, the 
only signal sent is to the self. Self-impression management, or appearing to the self as a 
person who does the right thing, may therefore be just as motivating as the presence of 
others at the time of payment. 
Beliefs about what others pay have been shown to influence PWYW payment 
amounts. Borck et al. (2006) found that buyers in an anonymous context who paid more 
thought a higher percentage of other buyers would submit some amount of voluntary 
payment relative to those paying less or not paying at all. Though not explicitly tested, 
this finding may suggest that consumers are influenced by social pressure even in 
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anonymous PWYW settings. For example, Jang and Chu (2012) found that individuals 
paid significantly less than a control group when they were told that a majority of other 
buyers tended to behave unfairly (“72% of people intended to pay zero”). Normative 
information in this case may have acted as a signal of the correct behavior. However, no 
mean payment difference was observed in a separate experiment between a control 
condition with no information about others’ payments and a condition where participants 
were informed that 92% of buyers would pay a fair price. It seems that norm-based 
information acted as a “get out of jail free card” in the conditions with unfair others and 
had no effect in the fair others condition. Jang and Chu did not test whether information 
about others acted as anchors or simply suppressed payments when that information was 
low.  
 PWYW presents an interesting twist on how descriptive norms might affect 
payment amounts. Similar to a public good dilemma, a PWYW strategy offers an 
incentive for free-riding behavior. Free riding refers to enjoying the good without paying. 
The standard model of private provision for public goods suggests that people only care 
about the total amount of payment (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986). Those believing 
that others will pay little or nothing may be motivated to pick up the slack by paying 
more, whereas those believing others are paying more may be less motivated to pay and 
be more likely to free-ride (Hardin 1968). Generally, individuals’ contributions to public 
goods decrease as the total amount increases, which is defined in economics as crowding 
out (Clotfelter 1985). This suggests that buyers led to believe that costs are being covered 
overall by the high amounts paid by others may actually pay less. This view of free riding 
(or crowding out behavior) is consistent with Riener and Traxler’s (2011) finding that 
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individual PWYW payments decrease on busy days. Consumers in a packed restaurant 
may assume many others are covering costs, which reduces the perceived need for higher 
individual payments. On the other hand, consumers may be motivated to pay more to 
support the greater good if they know or suspect that others are paying less.  
However, there are many cases where individuals violate these economic-based 
expectations (Andreoni 2006). One well known explanation for donating to a public good 
is “warm glow” or the good feeling associated with contributing to the common welfare 
(Andreoni 1990). It is unknown if warm-glow feelings exist in the case of a for-profit 
business using a promotion like PWYW. One example of a “for-profit” context similar to 
PWYW is an honesty box that may violate economic predictions. Although honesty 
boxes enlist a stronger injunctive norm (i.e., what one ought to pay) than true PWYW 
because suggested amounts are given, what one actually pays is neither observed nor 
enforced. A study by Levitt (2006) exploring bagel purchases from an honesty box found 
that higher amounts were paid when fewer bagels appear to have been purchased. Levitt 
suggested that when buyers could see that few bagels had been purchased, they knew 
there was little money in the till. As a result, buyers sought to make up for it by paying a 
higher amount, thus ensuring that the bagels and honesty box would remain in the office.  
Judgment and decision making and economics research may suggest competing 
hypotheses for the effect of external reference price information on voluntary payment 
amounts. Specifically, framing an ERP as a descriptive (vs. injunctive) norm may result 
in similar anchoring effects, causing those who are informed that others are paying more 
to also pay more. On the other hand, the presence of a high descriptive norm price may 
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result in the opposite effects, lowering payments due to free-riding and crowding out 
behavior.    
The preceding discussion of the influence of normative information suggests that 
ERP information framed in terms of a social norm may not simply act as an anchor. If it 
did, an ERP described as the average amount others pay should have an equivalent effect 
on price paid as would other ERP frames (suggested price, normal price). That is, the 
perceived amount paid by others should be positively correlated with the buyer’s 
payment amount. However, the experiments described above suggest that numeric 
information framed as a descriptive norm should have an influence on amounts paid that 
is not strictly anchor based.  It may be that PWYW payment amounts operate in a way 
other than that suggested by economic theory. The consumer behavior studies outlined 
here suggest that one can free ride by paying less when others are believed to be paying 
more or a buyer may choose to pay more when others are believed to be paying less.  
An average price paid by others that is presented to consumers by the firm acts as 
a descriptive norm indicating what the right thing to do it.  In contrast, a suggested price 
provided by the firm without reference to others acts as an injunctive norm.  It is 
expected that a descriptive norm will have a greater effect on behavior than an injunctive 
norm.  Just as Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius (2008) found that providing social 
norm information was more motivating in changing behaviors than traditional appeals, it 
is also possible that numeric information framed in terms of a social cue might also have 
stronger effects on  PWYW payment amounts.  For example, in a follow-up to the photo 
study, Gneezy et al. (2012) investigated why purchase rates were suppressed under 
PWYW compared to fixed and low price conditions. They argued the reason for this is 
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that consumers forego a purchase altogether because they “feel bad” when they consider 
paying less than the appropriate price. However, Gneezy and her associates found that if 
social norm information was provided (the average payment amount for a meal the day 
before), there was no difference between payments given to a cashier or made 
anonymously. It seems the social norm information may have acted like a pass that freed 
the consumer from social impression management concerns.     
Many PWYW studies find that people typically will act fairly, but only when it is 
not too expensive for them to do so (Gneezy et al. 2012; Jang and Chu 2012; Kim et al. 
2009). Consumers will pay higher relative payment amounts when they perceive the fair 
price to be low. For example, Jang and Chu (2012) reported that consumers made higher 
payments relative to the reference price when the product was less expensive. This effect 
coupled with buyers’ tendency to refrain from purchase altogether in a PWYW context 
(Gneezy et al. 2012) suggests that as a product becomes more expensive, the temptation 
to act selfishly by paying less is enhanced. As the financial price of the product and 
therefore the subjective cost of doing the right thing increases, people appear to either 
pay less or avoid purchase altogether.  
Motivations to appear to the self and others as a “good” person are very 
influential. Therefore, social norm framing should amplify the anchoring effects 
associated with nominal information. However, because PWYW is similar to a public 
goods dilemma, it is possible that free-riding will take precedence over the desire to act 
justly.  Despite this risk, it is expected that high vs. low ERPs framed as social norm 
information will result in the same traditional anchoring effect as an injunctive ERP 
frame (H2c). It is further expected that there is an interaction between normative frame 
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type and anchor value. When anchors are low, there will be no difference between 
injunctive and descriptive frames. However, because descriptive (vs. injunctive) norms 
are more predictive when a decision is consequential (i.e., the ERP is high), high 
descriptive (vs. injunctive) norm anchors will exert a stronger influence on payment 
amounts. High anchors framed in terms of a social cue will result in payments closer to 
the anchor price than those framed as company provided information. Formally: 
 H3: When external reference prices are high, an interaction is expected such that 
payments are closer to the provided ERP when it is framed as a descriptive (vs. 
injunctive) norm. No such difference is expected when the ERP is low.  
Setting Minimums and Maximums 
 It is possible in practice to have an ERP in a purchase setting that does not 
represent normative information, but instead as a ceiling or a floor amount for PWYW 
payments. Based on what is known about anchoring effects, it is possible that setting a 
“floor,” or minimum price may have unintended negative effects on PWYW payment 
amounts. That is, consumers may be more likely to anchor on the minimum price 
recommendation in deciding how much to pay in a PWYW context.  On the other hand, 
maximums – for which there seems to be little precedence in business practice –may 
increase average PWYW payments via anchoring effects.  
H4: Setting a maximum (vs. minimum) payment amount will result in higher 





Internal Reference Prices 
The final study in Essay 1 explores anchoring effects of recalled and explicitly 
stated internal reference price information. Internal reference price (IRP) information 
refers to the monetary expectations a consumer has about a product’s price prior to the 
focal purchase and independent of externally provided reference price information 
(Mayhew and Winer 1995). IRP is distinct from ERPs presented in the first three studies. 
All numeric information in the previously described studies has been externally provided 
rather than self-generated. It is possible that when a consumer actively recalls and reports 
IRP information, that number will affect amount paid more than when an IRP is not 
explicitly stated. Additionally, whether ERP information remains a predictor of payment 
amounts in the presence of recalled and reported IRP will give insight into the relative 
influence of company supplied information compared to an individual’s preexisting price 
expectations.  It should be noted that some level of IRP information by definition exists 
in all transactions, and therefore was internally available to consumers in the previously 
described studies. Study 4 tests the effect of recalled and reported IRPs on payments and 
explores the relative strengths of IRP and ERP information when both are present in the 
PWYW purchase context.   
Investigating internal reference price is more complicated than external reference 
price because IRP is a latent construct that exists in the mind of each consumer, which 
makes obtaining a meaningful and accurate measure difficult (Mazumdar et al. 2005). 
Research in the PWYW domain has used average prices paid in control conditions (those 
without ERPs) as a proxy for IRPs as a basis of exploring its influence on PWYW 
payments (Johnson and Cui 2013). This practice is problematic because it assumes 
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consumers are paying their full expected prices, which may not be the case for all 
consumers. It is difficult to understand how IRPs influence judgments and decisions even 
in traditional pricing contexts due to consumer heterogeneity. The current research 
explores IRP influence by comparing payments made in the presence of reported IRP 
information to those made without recall. The act of collecting IRP information is likely 
to bias subsequent payments and this notion is tested in study 4.  
Although IRPs contribute to price judgments, consumers’ valuations of a product 
or service are often uncertain and rely on external cues (Bettman, Payne and Luce 1998).  
When no external reference price information is available, price articulation proceeds in a 
two-stage process where the range of feasible prices is first evoked and then a price 
corresponding with maximum personal utility is determined (Chernev 2003). The process 
is much more effortful than articulating a WTP based on an external reference price 
providing normative information, because one must generate their own starting estimates. 
The relative influence of IRP to ERP information in forming judgments and 
guiding behavior has been explored in traditional pricing contexts. In order for an IRP to 
be used in forming a judgment, it must be accessible in memory (Biehal and Chakravarti 
1983) and perceived to be appropriate in the given purchase context (Feldman and Lynch 
1988). Mazumdar and Papatla (2000) reported differences in the relative weights given to 
IRP and ERP information in brand selection. They found that customer heterogeneity in 
areas such as brand loyalty and propensity to buy during promotions, as well as product 
level differences such as absolute price level and frequency of discounting, affected the 
relative importance of IRP in brand selection in different ways. In short, consumers use 
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both IRP and ERP, but the weights assigned to each vary based on individual and product 
differences.  
Accessibility-diagnosticity moderates the relative use of IRP and ERP in product 
judgments (Mazumdar et al. 2005). When IRP information is more difficult to remember 
or construct, a consumer sees it as less diagnostic than ERP information in determining 
WTP. IRPs are subject to accessibility or “ease of retrieval” bias in that past pricing 
information is deemed diagnostic only if easily recalled. Consequently, because 
accessible information is more diagnostic, it has a greater influence on judgments 
(Menon and Raghubir 2003). Interestingly, Monroe and Lee (1990) found that past prices 
that were not immediately accessible were found to nevertheless influence judgments at 
an unconscious level for low involvement purchases. Taken together, the results of these 
studies suggest that the act of recalling and reporting IRP information will have a 
stronger influence on judgments and decisions than will IRP information that is not 
explicitly called to mind and stated by the consumer. It has not been tested in previous 
research whether the act of recalling and reporting IRP will result in effects on prices 
paid that are stronger than demonstrated effects of an ERP. Formally: 
H5: When internal reference price (IRP) information is recalled and explicitly 
reported in the absence of an ERP, IRP information will be positively correlated 
with payment amounts.  
Johnson and Cui (2013) report mixed results for the relative influence of internal 
and external reference price information in a PWYW context. When the ERP presented 
was a minimum price, respondents’ payments were closer to the ERP than to the IRP 
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(measured as the average price paid in a control condition). Yet, when the ERP presented 
was a maximum price, consumers’ payment amounts were closer to the IRP than to the 
ERP. These findings suggest that consumers simply select whichever value is lower. 
When an ERP is presented as a maximum price that is greater than an IRP, the latter is a 
better predictor.  In contrast, when an IRP is higher than an ERP that is presented as a 
minimum price, then an ERP is more predictive. Also concerning in their study was the 
use of an average price paid in the control (i.e. no ERP present) PWYW condition as the 
IRP.  It should not be assumed that participants in the control conditions opted to pay full 
IRP. Rather than describing the relative influence of IRP, Johnson and Cui’s studies 
simply suggest that IRP information was overlooked in favor of externally provided 
numeric information when financially attractive to do so.   
In order to test whether an ERP or an IRP has a stronger influence on PWYW 
payment amounts, study 4 manipulates high and low ERP anchors in addition to recalled 
IRP information. In a test of anchoring effects on self-generated numbers versus 
experimentally provided numbers, Epley and Gilovich (2001) found that people report 
thinking first of an estimate and then moving up or down from there, thus resulting in an 
anchoring effect for self-generated numbers. Epley and Gilovich selected estimation tasks 
that assumed most individuals would not know the exact answer for but would likely 
have the same starting point for estimating the correct answer. For example, if asked what 
year Washington was elected president, 1776 is a plausible starting value. This is similar 
to a consumer determining a PWYW payment amount. Most consumers have a similar 
fuzzy estimation of how much the product is worth and then adjust that estimate to the 
desired payment amount. Anchoring effects demonstrated by Epley and Gilovich suggest 
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that IRP information explicitly recalled prior to reporting WTP in PWYW should act like 
ERPs, thus biasing responses. However, there is a possibility that exerting the mental 
effort necessary to self-generate and report an IRP will influence prices paid in a manner 
not biased by anchoring. Specifically, the act of recalling an IRP may have an influence 
on payments in addition to an anchoring effect because the consumer is more engaged in 
critical reasoning about the fair price.  Increased effort could therefore result in payments 
that are higher (or lower) regardless of ERP anchors. The influence of a recalled IRP on 
prices paid in combination with ERP information is explored in study 4.  
In the previous studies, consumers possessed internal and external reference price 
information, both of which are assumed to influence prices paid. Studies 1-3 suggested 
that internally held IRPs that are not explicitly defined are less influential than externally 
provided numeric information in a PWYW purchase context. If ERPs consistently 
influence payment amounts, then internally held IRPs that are not declared explicitly may 
be thought as having little effect on those payments. Study 4 explored how pre-existing 
expectations about normal prices charged and perceptions of value influence PWYW 
payments in the presence of ERP information. Although IRPs are by definition present in 
consumers’ minds, the IRPs were not made salient or measured in studies 1-3. Study 4 
tested whether explicitly recalled and reported IRPs will influence PWYW payments in a 
manner similar to ERPs. If the effects of IRPs and ERPs are consistent (both cause 
anchoring effects) then the result would be additive.  
It may be that recalled and reported IRP information is predictive of payments in 
PWYW contexts in the absence of ERPs. On the other hand, ERPs may remain the driver 
of payments even when IRPs are actively recalled. Biehal and Chakravarti (1986) 
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demonstrate that in brand selection, information stored in memory is underutilized 
compared to external information that is present during the decision task. Based on 
reference price research, it is expected that ERPs will have a stronger influence on prices 
paid compared to IRPs, even when IRP information is explicitly recalled and reported.  
H6: When internal reference price information is recalled and explicitly reported 
in combination with an ERP, the ERP will be a better predictor of amount paid in 
a PWYW context.    
Findings of studies 1-4 were expected to demonstrate anchoring and norm framing effects 
in a PWYW context. Although many consumers voluntarily pay more than what is 
required when given complete freedom to pay whatever they want, they may nevertheless 
be influenced by numeric information provided by the firm. The face value of a number 
and the manner in which it is presented may subtly guide decision making in an uncertain 
context. The following section outlines the proposed methodology for these studies, 
followed by results and a brief discussion of each study. Finally, a summary of the 
studies reported in essay 1 will be provided as well as a rationale for essay 2.  
 
OVERVIEW: STUDIES 1-4 
Hypotheses in essay 1 are tested in a set of four studies. All study contexts 
involve products/services that feature no social interaction. Studies were approved by the 
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects (CPHS), which serves as the University 
of Oregon's Institutional Review Board (IRB). Below the methods, stimuli, procedures 
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and findings are explained in detail. Table 2 provides an overview of studies and the 
related hypotheses.  
TABLE 2  
OVERVIEW OF HYPOTHESES TESTED: ESSAY 1 
Study Description Hypotheses Tested 
1 Normal Prices H1, H2a 
2 Injunctive v. Descriptive Norms H1, H2b, H2c, H3, 
3 Constraining PWYW Payments H1, H4 
4 Internal Reference Price Effects H1, H5, H6 
 
 
STUDY 1: ANCHORING EFFECTS OF INJUNCTIVE ERPS  
ON PWYW PAYMENT AMOUNTS   
 The purpose of study 1 is to replicate and extend findings from previous PWYW 
research where payments above zero have been found. In addition to demonstrating 
positive voluntary payments, study 1 extends research from traditional pricing contexts to 
demonstrate that anchoring effects are observed when consumers have complete control 
over payment amounts. In traditional pricing contexts, external reference prices can 
influence reported WTP price for goods (e.g., Ariely et al. 2003). It is expected that 
anchoring effects will be observed even when consumers have the option to pay nothing 









, 151 undergraduate business students (mean age = 21.32 years, 60.27% 
male) enrolled in marketing courses at a large northwestern university took part in the 
study in exchange for partial course credit. The study manipulated an external reference 
price (ERP) framed as a “normal” price as either high or low between subjects. All ERPs 
provided injunctive norm information in this study. 
Stimuli 
 Study 1 utilized a fictitious product in order to avoid brand effects and to control 
for prior experience. An intangible service was created that would be naturally purchased 
in an anonymous online context, be relevant to the sample population and have very low 
incremental cost. The following description for this “new” service called CLOUDX was 
provided: 
We are releasing CLOUDX, a service that lets you bring your photos, 
music, docs, and videos anywhere and share them easily. Never email 
yourself a file again! 
This means that any file you save to our service will automatically save to 
all your computers, phones and even our website, CLOUDX.com, which 
you can access from anywhere, anytime. It is compatible with all major 
smartphone platforms. CLOUDX also makes it super easy to share with 
others, whether you're a student or professional, parent or grandparent. 
Even if you accidentally spill a latte on your laptop, have no fear! You can 
relax knowing that we always have you covered, and none of your stuff 
will ever be lost. 
                                                          
1
 At the time these studies began running CLOUDX likely seemed more novel and attractive than it may be 
currently. Although services like DropBox existed, they were much less popular.  
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The CLOUDX basic package is offered on a monthly contract, which can 
be cancelled at any time and offers you 100GB of storage. 
Pretesting CLOUDX 
Two separate tests of the CLOUDX stimuli were run in order to assess interest 
level, expected price charged (internal reference price) and willingness to pay in a 
traditional price setting for this fictitious service offering. Because additional studies 
described in essay 2 used the CLOUDX stimuli, related data were collected over 
approximately a two year period. It was important to confirm that the product was still 
relevant and to monitor changes in the perceived value and expected pricing for this new 
technology product. During this time period (mid 2011 to late 2013), numerous real 
services similar to CLOUDX were launched and/or gained popularity such as Dropbox, 
Apple’s iCloud, Google Drive and Microsoft’s SkyDrive. A pretest in summer 2011 was 
repeated as a “post” test of sorts in winter 2013. This retesting was to ensure that the 
increased popularity of free cloud-based storage software did change perceptions of value 
significantly over time.   
The pretest run in 2011 with 82 participants from the same population as future 
studies (undergraduate business students) indicated that levels of interest in CLOUDX 
were sufficiently high. A 5-item scale for attitude towards CLOUDX (Cronbach’s α = 
.845; see Appendix A1 for measures) indicated a mean interest level of 5.03 out of 7 (SD 
= 1.10). A measure of interest in learning more about the product was 5.00 on a 7 point 





 for CLOUDX service (SD = 12.39, ranging from $0.00 to $50) and that they 
would be willing to pay $6.19 (SD = 6.54, ranging from $0.00 to $31), or approximately 
1/3 of the expected price charged. These results indicate that although interest level was 
only moderately high, participants may have reported less interest because they assumed 
the product would be priced more than they considered it to be worth.   
 Another test was run in early 2013 after all data collections using the CLOUDX 
stimuli were nearly completed. This “post” testing was to ensure that perceptions of value 
had not significantly changed over time. A total of 66 participants from the same 
population completed the post-test. Mean overall attitude toward the service in 2013 was 
4.57 (SD = 0.97) measured by the same scale described previously, which indicates a 
significant decrease in attitude from the 2011 pretest (t(146) = 2.739, p = .007). This is 
not surprising due to the introduction of similar products over the time period. However, 
participants reported a very similar willingness to pay for CLOUDX. Mean WTP in 2013 
was $6.16 (SD = 6.04, ranging from $0 to $35), which was not significantly different then 
WTP in 2011 (t(69) = -1.344, n.s.)
3
. Although WTP remained consistent over the time 
period, because attitude did change it is included as a covariate in the main studies 
reported below.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 Three participants’ expected prices charged were detected as outliers ($80, $80 and $90) per the outlier 
labeling rule (Hoaglin, Iglewicz and Tukey 1986). Their values were Windsorized to the mean plus 2 SDs 
(Fields 2005). Because WTP was reported as a percent of the expected charge these values were 
appropriately adjusted as well.  
 
3
 Only a subset of participants from both tests were asked WTP without any external price information, 




In the main study, participants were informed that a company that wished to 
remain anonymous was interested in feedback on a potential new service offering. Next, 
all participants read the same description of CLOUDX provided above and were quizzed 
as an attention check on the components of the service offering (see Appendix A2). 
Although a small percentage of participants missed the attention check question (11%), 
they were nevertheless retained in the analysis. Missing the attention check resulted in a 
pop-up informing them they answered incorrectly which was meant to increase attention 
moving forward. Next, participants reported how interested they were in learning more 
about CLOUDX, their likelihood of considering purchase and their attitude about 
CLOUDX (same as pretest, see Appendix A1). Participants were then informed that the 
company providing CLOUDX was considering selling it under a PWYW strategy. The 
exact text follows: 
The company that makes CLOUDX is considering offering this service 
under a Pick Your Price strategy, which allows customers to completely 
set their own prices for products. This means that you are able to select 
any price that you are willing to pay and you will receive the service, 
regardless of the amount that you select, from zero to a theoretically 
infinite amount.  
Participants were then asked to imagine that they were interested in purchasing 
CLOUDX and had gone to the website to find out more about the service. They were 
instructed to further imagine that they decided to try the service for one month.  
Participants were randomly assigned to either a low or high external reference price 
condition that was framed as the amount the company would charge for CLOUDX under 
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normal pricing conditions in all conditions. Anchors were set to approximately plus or 
minus one standard deviation (SD = 10.63) from the mean expected price as reported in 
the pretest. Both high and low anchors were adjusted slightly so as to seem more natural 
to participants (e.g., $24.99 rather than $26.31). When participants imagined looking for 
the price of the service on the website, they were given the following payment 
instructions: “How much do you think CLOUDX is worth? Although CLOUDX will 
normally be offered at $9.99 ($24.99) /month, we are offering you the chance to pay 
whatever you want.” Participants then indicated the price they would like to pay, which is 
the main dependent variable of interest. They also completed an open-ended qualitative 
measure reporting their thoughts and feelings about selecting their own price.  
Results 
Similar to those in the pretest, participants (n = 151) reported moderately 
favorable attitudes about CLOUDX service (M = 4.96, SD = 0.96). The mean voluntary 
payment for CLOUDX was $5.79 (SD = 5.51). Although all participants had the ability to 
pay nothing, only 31 individuals (20.5%), opted to do so. Reported voluntary payments 
ranged from zero (or “free,” as euphemistically reported by some) to a high value of $20 
per month. A one-sample t-test indicated that the mean voluntary payment (Mall = $5.79, 
SD = 5.51) was greater than zero on average, t(151) =12.968, p < .001. An independent 
sample t-test with anchor amount as the independent variable and payment amount as the 
dependent variable revealed a main effect of anchor level, t(150) = -4.042, p < .001. As 
shown in figure 1, participants in the high condition reported significantly higher 




The qualitative responses provided further insight into thoughts and feelings 
regarding the strategy of PWYW pricing. Coding of the open ended responses revealed 
68 participants that commented on the pricing strategy, rather than on the product/service 
itself. Many participants chose to comment on PWYW from a business perspective. 
FIGURE 1 
PWYW PAYMENT MEANS BY NORMAL PRICE ERP CONDITION: STUDY 1 
 
Some felt PWYW was a wise strategy for reasons such as gauging how much people are 
willing to pay and to stimulate initial interest in the new service offering. Others felt it 
was a poor strategy for the bottom line, mainly based on the belief that very few 
consumers will voluntarily pay any amount. From a consumer perspective, not all 
participants liked the ability to self-determine price, which was somewhat surprising. 
Only 11 out of 68 participants (16%) reported positive feelings related to picking their 
price (for example, “that would be awesome” and “LOVE IT!”). An equal amount of 
participants reported confusion or negative feelings such as “I would feel guilty not 












Low ($9.99) High ($24.99)
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skeptical that consumers who paid little or nothing would actually receive the same 
service as those paying higher amounts.  
Discussion 
Study 1 findings indicate that consumers will pay something in anonymous 
PWYW contexts in support of H1. Further, the payments are influenced by external 
information provided by the firm. As expected, consumers used the numeric information 
presented as the normal price as anchors that guide payment decisions. The study 
provides preliminary evidence that consumers will use numeric information present in 
PWYW exchanges as anchors. It is important to explore whether the meaning of the 
information will affect payments differently. Additionally, the qualitative responses 
provided some insight into the thoughts and feelings consumers have about PWYW. 
Surprisingly, the ability to self-determine payments is not universally liked.  
 
STUDY 2:  ANCHORING EFFECTS OF ERPs FRAMED AS INJUNCTIVE AND 
DESCRIPTIVE NORMS ON PWYW PAYMENTS 
 The purpose of study 2 was to replicate and extend findings from study 1. It was 
expected to replicate positive payments and anchoring effects in a different product 
context using two different ERP frames. ERPs framed as either an injunctive norm 
(“suggested” price) or as a descriptive norm (price that the average other has paid) were 
expected to demonstrate anchoring effects on payments.  
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Study 2 also tests normative effects based on how the numeric information is 
framed. Descriptive norms are set by others are doing and injunctive norms are based on 
what one ought to do. Because descriptive norm (vs. injunctive norm) information has 
been shown to be more predictive of behavior (Bicchieri and Xiao 2009), it is expected 
that social cue framing of ERP will result in payments that are more aligned with the 
anchor.   
Method 
 In early 2013, 199 participants (mean age = 20.67 years, 52.32% male) completed 
the study in exchange for partial course credit. The study utilized a 2 (norm frame: 
injunctive, descriptive) x 2 (ERP: low, high) factor between subjects design. A control 
condition with no ERP provided was also tested
4
. Participants were randomly distributed 
across conditions.   
Stimuli 
Participants were instructed to imagine buying a concert ticket for their favorite 
musician or band. Concert tickets were selected due to their anonymous and online nature 
of distribution, small incremental cost, relevance to the population (university students) 
and previous use in a PWYW study (Jang and Cui 2012). Rather than imagining speaking 
to a representative at the venue by phone as was done by Jang and Cui (2012), the current 
study had participants imagine buying the ticket online from the venue’s website.  
 
                                                          
4
 An additional condition (n=33) was given an extremely high ($99.99) suggested price. The mean payment 
in this condition (Mveryhigh = $52.56, SD = 33.52, ranging from $0 to $125).  
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Pretesting Concert Tickets 
 In order to assess the relevance and appropriateness of the purchase context, a 
pretest of 65 participants from the same population as used in the main study was 
conducted. Also, expected prices and maximum willingness to pay measures were 
included to give insight into individuals’ internal reference prices. The pretest supported 
assumptions that the product was familiar and desirable to participants, as well as the 
online context being the most likely manner of purchase (see Appendix B1 for complete 
response options). The results indicated that attending a concert two or three times a year 
was the most common response (36.9%) and over 72% reported attending a concert at 
least once a year. It was important to ensure that buying the ticket online was believable 
and common because the anonymous aspect of payment is a necessary component in 
study 2. As expected, over 90% of participants stated that if they were to buy a concert 
ticket in advance, they would most likely buy it online through either the venue’s website 
or a ticketing website
5
 (see Appendix B2 for complete item). Only one participant (1.5%) 
reported that calling a representative would be their most likely approach to making the 
purchase. When asked how likely they would be to attend if their favorite band’s concert 
was performing nearby on a day they could attend, over 50% reported they would be 
“extremely likely” to attend (M = 6.23, SD = 1.24 on a 7 point Likert scale; see Appendix 
B3). The pretest also collected expectations of the price for a ticket to see their favorite 
musical act in concert, as well as the most they would be willing to pay for that ticket 
(see Appendix B4). Participants expected the mean price charged for a ticket to be $58.86 
                                                          
5
 Four participants who reported never having attended a concert were not asked this question.  
54 
 
(SD = 24.90, ranging from $20 to $100)
6
 and the mean willingness to pay (maximum 
price) as $87.48 (SD = 35.87, ranging from $30 to $160)
7
. A paired sample t-test 
demonstrates the expected price for a favorite band ticket is significantly less than their 
maximum WTP for that ticket (t(60) = -9.909, p < .001). Participants’ WTP for a popular, 
nationally known band was also collected in order to estimate perceptions of the standard 
price for a concert ticket.  
Procedure 
 Participants were asked to imagine that a new music venue was opening in their 
town for nationally known musical acts and that they were interested in learning more 
about it. They were asked to imagine visiting the venue’s website and discovering that a 
favorite band or musician was performing on a date that they would be able to attend and 
that tickets would go on sale the next day. Participants were asked to report the name of 
the band to increase their involvement and to ensure that they were imagining themselves 
in a specific situation. All participants reported an actual musician or band. Qualtrics 
programming was used to auto-fill the selected band into following prompts. They were 
asked to further imagine that they returned to the website the following day to purchase a 
ticket. Next, participants saw screenshots of a payment page that contained slightly 
different information depending on the condition (see Appendix B5 for examples of all 
conditions). Participants in the control condition read the following: 
 
                                                          
6
 Three participants’ outlier expected prices were Windsorized to the mean plus 2 SDs.  
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How much do you think the ticket is worth?  
Our pricing policy lets you decide the amount you would like to pay for 
your ticket. All tickets are general admission so the price you pay will not 
affect where you sit at the concert. Once you enter your price, you can 
download your ticket or select to place it on will call to pick up the night 
of the show. You can choose any price to pay for your ticket. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either an injunctive norm frame condition that 
presented a “suggested” price from the venue or a descriptive norm frame condition in 
which they were informed approximately how much most people decide to pay. The 
injunctive frame condition included one additional sentence at the end of the above 
control condition screen stating “We suggest you pay at least ($X) for your ticket.” The 
amount suggested was manipulated between subjects as either $9.99 (low) or $24.99 
(high). In the descriptive norm frame conditions a sentence stating that “Most people 
decide to pay around ($X)” was added following the second sentence in the control 
condition text. Others’ payments were manipulated as $10 (low) and $25 (high) 
consistent with the injunctive norm, but rounded to seem more natural. Next, everyone 
indicated how much they would pay for their ticket. Length of time spent on the payment 
page was also collected. 
 After reporting their price paid, participants completed a thought listing task in 
which they were asked to describe the thoughts and factors they considered when 
determining the price paid and whether those thoughts were negative, positive or neutral. 
Next, participants rated the importance of six factors such as “paying a fair amount” and 
“personal financial situation” were in their decision making process. These factors were 
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selected based on the research questions and findings from qualitative responses during 
pretesting (see Appendix B6 for full list of factors and scale points). Participants also 
reported their best guess of what others would pay (only in the injunctive conditions as 
they were explicitly given this information in the descriptive norm conditions). 
Additional items measured the difficulty and effort involved in selecting a price and how 
much they liked the experience of selecting their own price. Next, participants answered 
a set of items regarding their effort level in the decision making process (see Appendix 
B7 for items). Participants reported whether in general they would prefer to select their 
own price or decide to accept or reject a fixed price and explained why. Finally, 
participants answered an open-ended response measuring qualitative thoughts and 
feelings about PWYW pricing generally. In addition, they answered a few questions 
about their concert attendance frequency and likelihood. Participants were thanked for 
their time and effort in completing the study.  
Results  
The mean voluntary payment for a concert ticket was reported to be $27.25 (SD = 
19.36)
8
. In contrast to study 1, very few participants (less than 2%) opted to pay nothing 
for the ticket. Reported payments ranged from “free” to $100. Payments were greater 
than zero on average, t(165) = 18.133, p < .001. An analysis of variance considering the 
four target conditions revealed a significant difference between conditions, F(3, 129) =  
8.828, p < .001, see table 3. A main effect of ERP level was observed, F(1,129) = 16.875, 
p < .001. Participants who were provided with higher numbers in the payment context 
                                                          
8
 Four participants reported outlier payment amounts identified by the outlier labeling rule. Their payments 
were Windsorized to 2 SD above the cell mean.  
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(Mhigh = $31.07, SD = 19.64), made significantly higher payments compared with those 
who were provided lower numbers (Mlow = $19.68, SD = 12.93). Additionally, there was 
a main effect of norm framing (F(1, 129) = 6.973, p = .009) such that those who were 
given information about what others pay made significantly lower payments (Mdescriptive = 
$21.80, SD = 14.45) compared to those who were give a suggested payment from the 
venue (Minjunctive = $28.99, SD = 19.60). Finally, there was a marginally significant 
interaction between ERP level and norm framing, F(1, 129) = 2.936, p = .089. 
TABLE 3 
MEANS OF PWYW PAYMENT AMOUNTS: STUDY 2 
 
Means (SD) table 
 Norm Framing Total 
descriptive injunctive 
ERP level 
low $18.34 (13.35) $20.94 (12.59) $19.68 (12.93) 
high $25.06 (14.88) $37.27 (22.12) $31.07 (19.64) 
Total $21.80 ( 14.45) $28.99 (19.60) $25.42 (17.55) 
Control    $34.61 (24.35) 
Participants who were given a high suggested price (an injunctive norm) paid more than 
those who were provided the same number framed as the average payment (a descriptive 
norm; p = .013) and no such difference was observed in the low ERP conditions (p = 
.914). It should be noted that means in all cells were at least directionally above their 
relative provided reference prices. See figure 2 for means. 
 A post hoc test compared the control condition (no ERP and therefore no 
normative frame) to the target conditions. Providing no ERP information yielded 
significantly higher payments (Mcontrol = $34.61, SD = 24.35), compared to both the low 
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injunctive ERP condition (Mlow_inj= $20.94, SD = 12.59), p = .020 and the low descriptive 
ERP condition (Mlow_desc = $18.34, SD = 13.35), p < .004. There was no significant 
difference between the control and either high ERP conditions, ps > .2.  
 Qualitative responses were also analyzed. Participants in the five target conditions 
(n=166) reported a total of 521 discrete thoughts/factors. Based on self-coded valence, 
participants were positive about the scenario in general (M = 0.546, on a scale of -1 to 1). 
FIGURE 2 
PWYW PAYMENT MEANS BY NORM FRAMES AND ERP CONDITION:  
STUDY 2 
  
 Due to the variation in open-ended responses in study 1, participants were further asked 
to indicate whether their responses were indeed regarding the factors that went into 
determining their payment amount or about something else (which they often were). This 
reduced responses to 245 discrete thoughts about voluntary price determination, the 



















 In addition to open-ended responses described above, subjects also rated the 
importance of six provided decision making factors (again, see Appendix B6 for factors). 
Analysis of variance on the importance of decision making factors across the five target 
conditions revealed no significant differences in importance in determining payment 
amount between conditions on any factors except how important “how much you think 
the venue would normally charge,” F(4,161) = 9.462, p = .016. Please see figure 3 for 
overview. A post hoc test revealed that participants in the control condition rated this 
factor as significantly more important (Mcontrol = 4.818, SD = 1.55) compared to those in 
the high injunctive condition (Mhigh_inj = 3.412, SD = 1.89), p = .01. This indicates that 
when the venue provided information about the charge in the form of a high suggested 
price, it was discounted in the decision making process. Analysis of variance revealed 
that there were significant differences in importance of decision making factors, F(5,990) 
= 65.573, p < .001.   
FIGURE 3 
























Post hoc testing revealed that self-focused factors such as “My own personal finances” 
and “Getting a good deal” were significantly more important in determining payments 
compared to more externally-focused concerns such as “cost to venue of putting on the 
show” and “how much the venue might normally charge.” See table 4 for mean 
differences between self-focused and firm-focused factors. 
TABLE 4 
T-VALUES FOR DECISION MAKING FACTOR IMPORTANCE: STUDY 2 
  Firm-Focused Factors 
 Pairwise  


















3.868 (<.001) 9.304 (<.001) 14.983 (<.001) 
Worth 2.753 (.006) 5.436 (<.001) 13.868 (<.001) 
“Good 
Deal” 
1.115 (.265) 6.551 (<.001) 12.231 (<.001) 
 
 There were no significant differences between conditions on how difficult it was 
to determine a price and how much participants liked determining their own price. 
Determining a voluntary payment was judged to be both relatively easy (Mall = 4.47, SD 
= 1.45) and enjoyable (Mall = 5.34, SD = 1.43), both measured on 7 point scales. 
Cognitive processing style (System 1 or System 2) was also measured on a four-item 
scale and there were no significant differences across all conditions. Participants in all 
conditions spent statistically equal time selecting payments (Mall = 7.88 seconds, SD = 
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5.81) and indicated equal agreement in “going with the gut,”  “deciding quickly,” and 
“considering several factors.”  However, participants reported disagreement with the 
statement that they “thought a lot” about how much they should pay. See table 5 for 
means. Finally, participants indicated they would be quite likely (Mall = 6.27, SD = 0.98) 
to buy the concert ticket described in the scenario in their real life.   
TABLE 5 
MEANS FOR PROCESSING MEASURES: STUDY 2 
Accuracy of Statements in PWYW 
Means (SD) 
7 pt strongly disagree to strongly agree 
I just went with my gut feelings 4.88 (1.48) 
I decided very quickly 5.20 (1.45) 
I considered several factors when deciding what 
to pay 
4.78 (1.53) 
I thought a lot about how much to pay 3.70 (1.57) 
 
Discussion  
Results from study 2 show continued support for H1 indicating that consumers are 
willing to voluntarily pay in anonymous settings. The main effect of the ERP level also 
provides continued support for anchoring effects on voluntary payments using different 
frames (H2b and H2c). It appears that numbers in PWYW settings influence payments 
whether they are described as a suggestion from the company (injunctive) or as the 
amount others are paying (descriptive). However, results further indicate that the 
meaning of numbers in PWYW payment contexts is influential beyond simple framing 
effects. If consumers anchor on the face value of the ERP alone then no differences 
would be observed based on how that number is framed. Frame also had a significant 
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main effect in that those who saw ERPs framed as injunctive norms paid more than those 
who saw ERPs framed as descriptive norms. Higher payments in injunctive frames may 
be due to the expected price for a concert ticket being greater than $25, indicating 
expected prices may have influenced payments more than firm suggested price. 
Most interestingly, the moderating effect of frame on payments revealed that 
framing effects were observed only when the ERP was high, thus supporting H3. When 
the ERP was low, payments were the same regardless of whether that number was a 
suggestion from the firm or information about what others were paying. However, 
because payments in low ERP conditions were significantly less than those made in the 
control condition, this suggests that presenting a low number in a PWYW payment 
context may actually suppress payments on average. This finding is important to firms 
who may be tempted to suggest a lower payment in order to seem fair or to avoid 
seeming greedy and facing potential backlash from consumers. Importantly, this may also 
affect firms considering placing low limits on PWYW payments (such as $2 minimums 
rather than true PWYW) to avoid zero payments. This possibility will be explicitly 
explored in study 3.  
When ERPs were high, average PWYW payments were significantly different 
between frames. When $25 was framed as a suggested amount from the venue, 
participants paid significantly more than when it was framed as the amount others were 
paying. In fact, participants who were given high descriptive ERPs paid a statistically 
equal amount (MHighDescriptive = $25.06, SD = 14.88) to the ERP, (t(33) = .023, n.s. This 
indicates that when the frame is descriptive and the ERP is high, the number is predictive 
of payments. It is important to note that although participants in the descriptive norm 
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frame conditions paid very close to the ERP amount, the face value of that amount was 
lower than mean payments in the injunctive norm frame condition. Participants exposed 
to high injunctive norms actually made significantly higher payments than the ERP. This 
suggests that when it is costlier to voluntarily meet or exceed ERPs, descriptive frames 
are more predictive. It is also possible in this case that injunctive norm framed with high 
ERPs yielded higher payments because participants expected to pay more than $25 for a 
concert ticket. This would suggest that those exposed to the descriptive norms perceived 
having a “pass” to pay lower amounts, but those in the injunctive norm frame were 
sensitized to do what was “right” for the service provider.  
Participants in this study reported higher levels of interest and correspondingly 
higher levels of payment for concert tickets compared to the CLOUDX software prompt 
used in study 1. It is noted that context and product type should have important 
implications for voluntary payments. Even though both contexts feature intangible 
products and anonymous purchase settings, there appears to be important differences in 
how consumers respond to a PWYW option.   
These results indicate that other formats of ERP will have similar effects on 
voluntary payments. Study 2 provides further insight about what types of information 
might be best to provide in the purchase context. Findings suggest that when ERP is low, 
the frame may not be particularly important. However, when the stakes are higher, 
consumers may be more influenced to follow suit by paying prices similar to the average 
other. Because descriptive norms are very influential, firms should be cautious when 
displaying this type of information, as it is out of immediate control. Study 2 results 
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suggest firms would be well advised to not display what others are paying unless that 
amount is sufficiently high.  
 
STUDY 3: CONSTRAINING PAYMENTS IN A PWYW CONTEXT 
Study 3 was designed to further explore the anchoring effects of low and high 
ERPs in PWYW purchase contexts. The study was expected to demonstrate continued 
support for H1 in that consumers will voluntarily pay more than zero for intangible 
products that are anonymously purchased. Although setting minimum and maximum 
payment levels is technically not “true” PWYW, many real world firms such as 
Bandcamp and Genero.us encourage sellers to set minimum prices and let consumers 
voluntarily opt to pay more. According to Bandcamp.com, 40% of the time consumers 
pay more than the minimum price for mp3 track downloads. Sellers may avoid “free” 
sales in letting consumers determine price by requiring at least a small payment. 
However, anchoring effects in studies 1 and 2 suggest that this minimum price may in 
fact drive average prices down. Setting a maximum price may seem counterintuitive to a 
seller, as it might only prevent unusually high payments
9
; however, it is expected that 
high “caps” on payments will actually raise average payments through anchoring effects. 
To the authors’ knowledge, there is no business that currently uses a PWYW model that 
incorporates a maximum payment amount.   Exploring the effects of a low minimum and 
a high maximum will extend anchoring theory in a new context and a new frame. Further, 
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the results are expected to demonstrate that setting maximums may be more profitable for 
firms compared to either setting minimums or true unconstrained PWYW strategies (H4). 
Method 
 In late 2013, 76 participants (57.33% male) were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk to answer a short survey answering questions about buying music 
online and were compensated 25 cents. Mechanical Turk is an online labor market where 
workers are paid to complete tasks that is often used for consumer research. The study 
was limited to U.S. based workers. The study utilized a 3-level, one factor (constraint: 
none, minimum, maximum) between subjects design. Participants were randomly 
distributed across conditions.   
Stimuli 
 Study 3 tests a third product that is intangible and often purchased in an 
anonymous online context. In this study, participants are asked to imagine purchasing an 
mp3 album download. This context was selected due to familiarity. Further, music 
downloads are one of the most common products to be offered under a PWYW strategy 
in business practice.  
Procedure 
 Participants were asked to imagine that they were considering purchasing an 
album by a band they had recently heard about. They further imagined going to the 
band’s website, listening to a few sample tracks and liking what they heard. They were 
informed that they decided to buy the album download and were then directed to a 
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payment screen. Participants were randomly assigned to constraint conditions. All 
conditions were displayed as “Name Your Price” with an open text box. To the right of 
the open text box, the no constraint condition stated “no minimum,” the minimum 
condition stated “$2 minimum” and the maximum read “$25 maximum” (see Appendix C 
for payment screen images for all conditions). Responses were also constrained by 
Qualtrics so that if an answer was outside the constraint for the condition, the participant 
was given an error message and could correct the payment.    
 After reporting a voluntary payment amount, participants completed the same 
thought listing and feelings items described in study 2. They next answered a 
manipulation check that asked them to recall whether or not they were given a minimum 
or maximum amount that they could pay. Finally, they were thanked for their 
participation and received a randomly generated number for compensation purposes.  
Results  
 Ten individuals were removed from the analysis because they could not 
accurately recall whether or not there was a minimum or a maximum payment amount. 
No one opted to pay zero in the control
10
 or maximum conditions, but 38% of the 
participants in the $2 minimum condition opted to pay exactly $2. No participants paid 
over $20 in the maximum condition and no participant paid over $10 in either the control 
or minimum conditions. See figure 4 for distribution of payments across conditions. The 
high frequency of $2 payments in the minimum condition (38%) vs. other conditions (6% 
of combined control and maximum conditions) suggests that a minimum price may act 
                                                          
10
 One individual in the control condition paid 1 cent.  
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more as a default than an anchor which can be a very strong determinant of behavior 
(Amir et al. 2005).  
FIGURE 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS BY CONSTRAINT CONDITION: STUDY 3 
 
The mean payment for the mp3 album download was $5.70 (SD = 3.64), which is 
significantly greater than zero, t(65) = 12.71, p < .001. Analysis of variance revealed that 
there were also significant differences in payments across conditions, F(2,63) = 7.753, p 
= .001 (see figure 5). Post hoc tests revealed that participants in the maximum condition 
(Mmax = $7.90, SD = 4.78), paid significantly more than those in either the control 
(Mcontrol = $5.29, SD = 2.47) or minimum (Mmin = $3.95, SD = 2.16) conditions, ps < .003. 
Those in the control condition paid on average $1.34 more than those in the minimum 























PWYW PAYMENT MEANS BY CONSTRAINT CONDITION: STUDY 3 
 
 Qualitative responses indicated that participants had mixed feelings about 
determining their own payment for the album download. Average valence was slightly 
positive (Mall = 0.339, SD = 0.312, scale negative to positive 1). There were no 
differences between conditions on the importance of factors considered in determining 
payment, ps > .1 (see figure 6).   
FIGURE 6 




























Once again, post hoc tests revealed participants reported self-focused items (“getting a 
good deal” and “my own personal finances”) as significantly more important in 
determining payment amounts than firm-focused items (“the cost to the company of 
providing the music” and  “how much the company would normally charge”). However, 
in this context fairness was not less important than the self-focused factors, see table 6 for 
means and p vales.   
TABLE 6 
T-VALUES FOR DECISION MAKING FACTOR IMPORTANCE: STUDY 3 
  Firm-Focused Factors 
















Personal Finances .691 (.490) 4.092 (<.001) 6.483 (<.001) 
Worth .000 (1.00) 3.401 (.001) 2.391 (.017) 
“Good Deal” .319 (.750) 3.720 (<.001) 6.111 (<.001) 
 
Discussion 
To an audience unfamiliar with anchoring effects, it may seem farfetched to 
suggest capping PWYW payments. Although occasional large payments may be 
observed when there is no maximum, it may be that the difference can be made up by 
anchoring effects over many payments. Maximums elicit anchoring effects without the 
reactance associated with a very high suggested price. Study 3 demonstrates that setting a 
maximum PWYW limit yields higher payments compared to setting either a minimum or 
a true PWYW (no constraints) in this context, thus supporting H4. Although true PWYW 
and a set minimum strategy yielded equivalent mean payments in this study, it is possible 
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that true PWYW will outperform set minimums across a larger sample. Given only 42 
respondents in the maximum and minimum conditions combined in this study, the 
maximum condition yielded double the total income compared to the minimum 
condition. Beyond anchoring effects, it seems that imposing a minimum payment may act 
as a default. Mean payments made with minimum restrictions are driven down both by 
anchoring effects and because respondents may see paying the minimum as acceptable or 
fair. In true PWYW, the minimum is in fact zero, but there is not likely the same 
perception of acceptability of paying nothing.  In fact, 6 out of 8 respondents who paid 
the minimum specifically mentioned it as a determining factor in their decision making. It 
is important to note that the control condition did not set a default at zero (again, recall no 
one in this condition chose to pay $0). It is clear from this research that the manner in 
which payment information is presented has an effect on payments. Rather than “$0 
minimum” using the wording “no minimum” may help avoid setting $0 defaults in true 
PWYW scenarios.       
Study 3 was more subtle in the use of PWYW pricing than earlier studies. Rather 
than introducing and explaining “Pick Your Price” strategy to participants, this study 
simply asked them to name their price. This study was more like how consumers would 
naturally encounter PWYW, stating only “name your price” rather than a paragraph 
explanation of the pricing strategy used in other studies. Study 3 provides increased 
confidence that hypothetical payments in these studies accurately predict genuine 
consumer behavior.  
As previously mentioned, product type may have influenced these findings. The 
qualitative responses indicate that at least some participants cared about how much 
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money the band received for the album. Responses such as “I’m a fan” and “the band has 
to make a living” suggest that participants are more motivated to pay for creative content 
than for a mass produced service such as software (CLOUDX).  These effects may not be 
the same for a “for-profit” business. Additionally, findings from this study may especially 
applicable for firms expecting to sell many units under PWYW. If the total number of 
sales is small, the total yield from a maximum price strategy may not be enough to 
override those occasional very large payments under minimums or true PWYW. 
However, given more unit sales, it may be that setting maximums might be the most 
profitable strategy.  
 Moving forward, a final study in essay 1 tests the influence of self-generated 
reference prices on voluntary payments. Previous studies herein have demonstrated 
anchoring effects of numbers that are externally provided by the firm. Participants’ 
inherent thoughts about how much the product is worth and how much the company 
would normally charge (internal reference prices) may also have influenced payments. 
Measuring internal reference prices is somewhat challenging because asking participants 
about expected prices may cause price to have a greater influence on payments than if 
price was not explicitly reported. Study 4 explores the role reported reference prices have 







STUDY 4: INTERNAL REFERENCE PRICE EFFECTS ON  
PWYW PAYMENT AMOUNTS 
 The final study in essay 1 compares effects attributable to internal vs. external 
reference prices on PWYW payments. Studies 1-3 have manipulated reference price 
information given by the firm that is explicitly presented in the purchase context. 
However, a potentially important predictor of payment amounts in a PWYW setting is the 
buyer’s preexisting internal reference price. The effects of IRPs will be assumed in the 
control conditions where no ERP information is provided because IRPs are inherently 
present in all purchase contexts (Mazumdar et al. 2005). However, actively recalling and 
reporting IRP information may have a biasing effect on payment amounts. Study 4 tests 
whether reporting IRP information causes payment amounts to change and whether 
reported IRPs are more or less predictive than ERP information in PWYW settings.  
Method and Stimuli 
 During fall quarter of 2012, 105 participants (mean age = 21.53 and 55.77% male) 
were undergraduate business students from a large northwestern university who took part 
in exchange for partial course credit. A randomized 4 condition (Control, IRP only, IRP + 
low ERP and IRP + high ERP) between subjects design was utilized. As in study 1, 
CLOUDX was included as the product context.  
Procedure 
 The introduction and basic materials were similar to study 1. Participants were 
informed an anonymous software company was interested in their reactions to a new 
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service offering called CLOUDX. They read a short service announcement, were quizzed 
on their understanding of the service and reported their interest level and attitudes about 
the product (see Appendices A1&2). Participants assigned to reported internal reference 
price conditions were then asked to report how much they thought the company might 
charge for the service per month and how likely they would be to purchase the service at 
that price. They also reported how much CLOUDX would be worth to them personally 
on a monthly basis. Participants in a control condition did not answer these questions. 
These participants are assumed to have similar reference prices implicitly, but were not 
asked to explicitly report them.   
Next, all participants were given the same explanation of PWYW pricing and 
instructed that the company manufacturing CLOUDX was considering distributing it 
under this strategy. Everyone was instructed to imagine that they might try the service for 
a month depending on the price. When checking the price and deciding to purchase the 
service, participants in conditions with no ERP present saw the following statement: 
“How much do you think CLOUDX is worth? We are offering you the chance to pay 
whatever you want.” Those in the ERP present conditions read the same phrase with the 
addition of “Although comparable services are priced between $2 and $4 (low ERP) ($8 
and $16; high ERP) per month” prior to the offer of PWYW pricing. The low ERP value 
was selected to approximate WTP and the high ERP value was nearer to what 
participants expected the company to charge based on findings from the pretest. These 
values also represent equivalent magnitude ranges.  
All participants reported their PWYW payment amounts. They next completed 
the same thought listing task as in study 1, which collected the factors considered in price 
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determination.  They then reported the difficulty of selecting a price. Finally, all 
respondents completed an open-ended response item on their thoughts and feelings about 
PWYW.  
Results 
 In conditions where internal reference prices were reported (n = 79), participants 
estimated that CLOUDX would cost $15.87 (SD = 11.01)
11
 per month and reported 
CLOUDX would be worth $6.88 (SD = 7.76)
12
. There were no differences between 
conditions in estimated charge or reported worth, ps > 0.3. There was a significant 
correlation between estimated charge and reported worth, r = .527, p (two tailed) < .01, 
indicating that the more participants felt CLOUDX was worth, the more they thought the 
company would charge for it. However, CLOUDX’s reported worth is significantly less 
than the estimated charge, t(156) = 5.931, p < .001. The average reported voluntary 
payment for CLOUDX was $4.71 (SD = 6.02)
13
. It should be noted that the reported 
payments were lower in aggregate than those found in study 1, which may be due to 
differences in the ERP levels between studies. As a reminder, in study 1, the low ERP 
value was $9.99 and in the current study it was $2-$4. The high ERP in study 1 was 
$24.99 vs. $8-$16 in the current study.   
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 Nine participants reported outlier estimated charges per the outlier labeling rule and were Windsorized to 
the outlier cutoff value ($39.81).   
 
12 Three participants reported outlier worth values per the outlier labeling rule and were Windsorized to the 
outlier cutoff value ($28.17) 
 
13
 Three participants voluntary payment amounts were detected as outliers based on cell means and the 
outlier labeling rule. These payments were Windsorized to 2 SD above cell means.   
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 Analysis of variance revealed voluntary payments were significantly different 
across conditions, F(3,101) = 12.639, p < .001 (see figure 7). A planned Helmert contrast 
revealed that participants in the control condition paid significantly more (Mcontrol = 
$10.00, SD = 8.53) than those in all other conditions, p < .001. 
FIGURE 7 
PWYW PAYMENT MEANS BY IRP AND ERP CONDITION: STUDY 4 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the difference between low and high ERP conditions did not 
reach significance (p = .211), although the pattern directionally supports the findings 
from studies 1-3. This lack of significance despite participants in the high ERP condition 
paying twice the amount as those in the low ERP condition is most likely due to a small 
sample size and a high variation in responses. Also of note, multiple regression revealed 
that internal reference prices were predictive of payment amounts, explaining 15.6% of 
the variance in payments (R
2
 = .156, F(2,76) = 7.500, p = .002).  Participants’ estimates 












Control IRP only IRP + low ERP IRP + high ERP
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much CLOUDX was worth (β = .313, p = .014) significantly influenced payment 
amounts.  
Discussion 
 Study 4 provides strong support for H5 and H6, demonstrating that when 
participants were asked to explicitly report internal reference prices, payments were 
different compared to when this information was not recalled and reported. Internal 
reference prices were predictive of payments and anchoring effects of ERPs were 
observed.  It was expected that those who reported were likely to anchor on those self-
reported reference prices. However, because participants in the internal reference price 
conditions paid significantly less than those in control conditions, this suggests a different 
process of influence. The difference between control and the IRP-only condition is quite 
interesting. It suggests that the act of thinking about prices may suppress payments in 
general. It is possible that rather than having an anchoring effect on payments, something 
about the actual act of effortfully estimating the expected price charged and its perceived 
worth may have decreased payments. Essay 2 will explore the possibility that dual 
processing plays an important role in determining voluntary payments.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In sum, the four studies in essay 1 demonstrate strong support for the feasibility of 
PWYW for intangible products in anonymous purchase contexts. Across three different 
types of products (software, concert tickets and mp3 album downloads) positive 
voluntary payments on average are observed in all conditions. Further, anchoring effects 
on voluntary payments are observed thus providing support for the hypothesis that higher 
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numbers in PWYW purchase contexts have a biasing influence on participants’ payment 
amounts. The meaning of provided numbers is also demonstrated to be influential. Firms 
have the option to provide external reference price information in a variety of formats. 
Higher external reference prices provided by the firm represent an injunctive norm and 
were shown to result in higher voluntary payments. Studies 1-4 test injunctive norm 
frames expressed as normal prices, suggested payments, minimums and maximums, and 
competitor prices, all of which influenced payments.  
Firms can also provide information about descriptive norms to consumers in 
PWYW settings by providing information about how much others are paying. Results 
from study 2 indicate that descriptive norms are more influential than injunctive norms 
when the numeric information is high. In this case, a higher number framed as a 
descriptive (vs. injunctive) norm caused lower payments because those in the injunctive 
condition paid above the suggested price. It may even be speculated that when informed 
that others are behaving in an unfair manner, it allows others to do the same and mitigates 
feelings of guilt and pressure to “do the right thing.” Future research should address how 
different levels of ERPs related to expected prices can moderate the influence of the 
reference price on payments.   
Study 3 demonstrates the counterintuitive idea of implementing a limit on how 
much consumers may voluntarily pay. From a business perspective, it may seem odd to 
hinder people from paying extremely high amounts. However, because of the strong 
effect of anchoring, capping payments and explicitly displaying that high limit might 
subtly increase payments overall. Although restricting payments is not “true” PWYW in 
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an academic sense, it is often done in practice and these findings should prove interesting 
to practitioners.  
 Findings from study 4 were somewhat surprising and worthy of further 
exploration. One might expect that recalling and reporting internal reference price 
information would have a positive effect on payments. Participants used their own 
reported internal reference price information in determining payments. It is also possible 
that the act of thinking about regular prices and how much the service is worth might lead 
to higher payments out of a sense of justice. However, the opposite effect was observed 
in study 4. It is possible that the face value of the internal reference prices had a negative 
impact on payments. Another possibility is that payments are reduced when consumers 
are more engaged in the decision making process. Additional evidence for this 
explanation is the repeated pattern observed of higher prices in control conditions 
compared to those where external reference prices were provided. It may be that numeric 
information of any sort suppresses PWYW payments. Four studies in essay 2 test these 












CHAPTER III  
ESSAY 2: PLEASE PAY WHAT YOU WANT…QUICKLY! 
DUAL PROCESSING AND PAY-WHAT-YOU-WANT CONTEXTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Essay 2 considers the effects of cognitive processing styles on Pay-What-You-
Want (PWYW) payments. PWYW is a pricing strategy where buyers are given control to 
select any price, from zero to a theoretically infinite amount, which the seller must accept 
(Kim et al. 2009). This dissertation explores some of the factors that may influence 
payment decisions in anonymous PWYW contexts. Evidence from past literature and 
findings from essay 1 indicate that PWYW payments are malleable and predictable in 
some cases. Essay 1 examined anchoring effects of numeric information presented as 
different types of norms on PWYW payments. The findings suggested consumers under 
low cognitive effort can be influenced by numbers present in the PWYW purchase 
context. Essay 2 specifically tests whether the amount of cognitive effort invested in price 
determination affects PWYW payments. The manner in which consumers determine 
voluntary payment amounts may provide insight into basic human motivations. 
Additionally, there are important practical implications for firms considering 
implementing PWYW pricing strategies.  
Studies 1-3 in essay 1 demonstrated that consumers use heuristics that lead to 
decision making biases, specifically anchoring and framing effects, when determining 
PWYW payments. Results from study 4 suggested that recalling and reporting internal 
reference price (IRP) led to lower payments compared to payments made by those who 
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did not recall price IRP information. It would not be surprising if, in the absence of 
externally provided numeric information, consumers anchor on self-reported IRPs when 
determining how much to pay in PWYW contexts. On the other hand, payment amounts 
may have been lower because of the increased cognitive effort associated with recalling a 
price. The studies in essay 2 investigate this possibility.   
Essay 2 explores the possibility that consumers pay higher PWYW amounts when 
deciding quickly on an amount to pay than when investing a greater amount of thought 
and effort.  Such an effect is counterintuitive because acting in one’s own self-interest is 
thought to be an automatic response in most situations (Epley and Caruso 2004; Moore 
and Loewenstein 2004). Two possibilities might explain why quicker decision-making 
elicits higher PWYW amounts. First, it is possible that the first impulse may be in fact to 
act justly (rather than in self-interest) in the face of selfish temptation and that this is an 
automatic response that leads to higher PWYW amounts. A second alternative is that 
conserving mental effort by using heuristic based decision making may trump both 
justice and self-interest concerns. Four experiments reported herein manipulated 
processing styles to explore effects on payments and to test two additional hypotheses.  
Following is a brief review of two streams of research related to essay 2. The 
basic human motivations of self-interest and justice are introduced and research relevant 
to PWYW pricing is described. Next, an overview of System 1 and System 2 processing 
is provided. Three hypotheses related to the effects of basic motivations and cognitive 





Self-Interest and Justice: Two Fundamental Motivations 
Judgments and decisions are driven by two fundamental motivations, self-interest 
and justice, which can often be in conflict (Lerner and Clayton 2011). Self-interest is 
defined as pursuing actions that maximize personal utility (Miller 1999). The belief that 
people will only do what they are paid for or otherwise rewarded for doing is widespread 
(Lerner and Clayton 2011). The primacy of self-interest as the explanation for judgments, 
decisions and actions dates back (at least) to the ancient Greek philosophers (Mansbridge 
1990). Our tendency to “look out for number one” is a basic assumption underlying the 
scientific fields of economics and evolutionary psychology, among others. However, 
many observable actions as well as emotional reactions and judgments are not easily 
explained by selfish motives. For example, giving to a charity and returning a lost wallet 
could be seen as violations of self-interest. These irrational behaviors suggest that we 
may be motivated by concerns other than strict self-interest. Researchers have recently 
become more interested in explaining the role of justice as a motivator of judgment and 
decision making.  
The justice motivation refers to thoughts about what one “ought” to do that are 
experienced cognitively or preconsciously (Lerner and Clayton 2011). It includes the 
desire to ensure that people get what they deserve or what they are entitled to have 
through their past actions or status. The justice motivation is vastly more complex, less 
studied and therefore less well understood than the self-interest motivation. Researchers 
refer to the basic idea of the “ought” imperative under many names other than justice, 
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such as fairness, deservingness, entitlement, etc. The concepts of reciprocity, altruism, 
warm glow, etc. are also closely related to the justice motive. Adding more complexity is 
that what is “just,” or what one “ought” to do in any given situation, is subjective and 
heterogeneous across individuals and contexts. 
The potential conflict between justice and self-interest motivations is clear in 
PWYW contexts where self-interested consumers would be expected to pay little or 
nothing, whereas concern for justice should encourage the desire to make a fair payment.  
Neoclassical economics predicts every consumer will pay nothing under PWYW (pure 
self-interest), but the assumption that people are fundamentally self-interested has been 
recently contested (Lerner and Clayton 2011). There are many examples of human 
behavior that violate pure self-interest, such as contributing to public goods and offering 
fair splits in ultimatum and dictator games.  
A firm perceived as fair may deserve higher payments due to the principle of 
reciprocity. However, reciprocity motivations are normally defined as interpersonal 
mutual back-scratching (Gouldner 1960) and this may not translate to a consumer-to-firm 
context. Little is known about the role of reciprocity in a marketing exchange 
relationship, despite calls for its investigation (Bagozzi 1995). Returning kindnesses is 
indeed an important behavioral driver and fundamental societal building block, but it may 
be erroneous to assume that reciprocity norms extend to non-human exchanges such as in 
the case of for-profit firms.  However, some experimental evidence suggests that 
consumers reciprocate with firms. For example, Morales (2005) found that consumers 
perceiving higher firm effort in product display presentation rewarded those firms with 
increased store preference and higher willingness-to-pay (WTP).  
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Behavioral economic experiments using ultimatum and dictator games provide 
intriguing examples where rational self-interest assumptions are violated (see Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Rabin 2003 for review). In the ultimatum game, two subjects are paired, 
usually anonymously, and one is assigned to be the proposer and the other the responder. 
The proposer is given money ($10 is a standard allotment) and then instructed to suggest 
a split to the responder. The responder may choose to accept the proposal and both 
subjects will receive the cash as allotted by the proposer. Alternately, the responder can 
choose to reject the proposed distribution and neither participant will receive any cash. 
Both offering more than a minimal split and rejecting any proposed split are technically 
irrational, but both behaviors are seen quite frequently in the lab. Dictator games have 
similar rules, although the ability to reject the offer is taken away from the second player 
who can only passively receive the determined split. Players often give at least some 
money to others even under the condition of anonymity and in the absence of possible 
retaliation. These games are normally played in a person-to-person context, which may 
amplify these seemingly just allocations. Interestingly, Hoffman, McCabe, Shechat and 
Smith (1994) found that when ultimatum game players were labeled as buyers and 
sellers, sellers still gave more money than necessary to buyers. These findings suggest 
interpersonal tendencies for fairness may transfer to a marketing exchange. 
Fair or reciprocating behaviors suggest that consumers may pay more than zero in 
PWYW out of concern for fairness. PWYW studies have shown that consumers often 
voluntarily pay positive amounts in both experimental and real purchase contexts (see 
table 3 for an overview). It is expected even when making a PWYW purchase in an 
online context free from social pressure that many consumers will pay more than nothing 
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for a product in PWYW. It would be useful for researchers to investigate what factors and 
processes are responsible for such positive payments. It seems clear that consumers are 
not strictly self-interested. All studies in essay 2 are expected to support H1, which was 
presented and supported in essay 1. Again, this hypothesis states that: 
H1: Anonymous PWYW payments are greater than zero on average. 
Many PWYW researchers have speculated the reason for any PWYW payment 
above zero may be out of a concern for justice (often referred to as fairness) or the desire 
to appear fair to others as well as the self (impression/image management). Consumers 
may have varying levels of concern for fairness, justice, reciprocity and altruism. 
Marketers can also manipulate fairness concerns through promotional materials presented 
prior to the payment or communications during the actual exchange. However, 
consistency in fairness measurements and manipulations in PWYW studies has been 
lacking and findings regarding its effects have been mixed.  
Gneezy et al. (2010; 2012) provide compelling evidence for the fairness motive. 
When consumers purchased PWYW souvenir photos from an amusement park, they paid 
significantly more on average when a portion of the payment was donated to charity 
compared with a traditional PWYW group. Additionally, fewer consumers purchased 
photos with PWYW pricing when the charity component was present (vs. traditional 
PWYW) suggesting that fairness motives suppress purchases due to a reluctance to pay 
an “unfairly” low amount when a charity is involved. 
Other studies are less persuasive in demonstrating the influence of fairness on 
PWYW payments. Jang and Chu (2012) explored fairness motivations as their primary 
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focus. They manipulated what could be considered to be a fair payment by providing 
different levels of cost information. They hypothesized that if consumers were concerned 
with paying a price that was fair to the firm, payments should increase as the perceived 
cost to the firm increased. Although they found that consumers given higher cost 
information did pay more than those who were not, the fairness motivation was easily 
overridden by social cues. When participants were informed others were not paying fair 
amounts, they were more likely to pay less, conforming to the descriptive norm. Jang and 
Chu did not address the possibility that payments increased when cost information was 
higher due to anchoring effects rather than paying more out of fairness. 
Kim et al. (2009) found that “fairness positively affects the final price paid” with 
fairness measured as a single item (“My price paid toward the seller was fair”). Such a 
measure merely indicates that those paying higher prices reported the prices they paid 
were fairer. Moreover, this finding was supported only in two of the three product 
contexts. Even more telling, although paying on average significantly less than self-
reported reference prices, consumers believed they had behaved fairly. In sum, these 
findings indicate that at best fairness only influences payments in some contexts for some 
consumers and, at worst, fairness is not motivating them to pay a fair price from a firm’s 
perspective.  
A concern for justice seems intuitively appealing when trying to understand why 
consumers make any payment in PWYW contexts. A research question proposed in this 
section is whether justice motivations influence payment amounts. Two studies (studies 1 
and 2) in essay 2, each using a different manipulation, tested for fairness effects on 
PWYW payment amounts. These manipulations were meant to increase the salience of 
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the fairness. No formal hypothesis is presented due to conflicting predictions outlined 
above, but the manipulations and results will be reported and discussed subsequently.  
Dual Processing: A Tale of Two Systems 
Differences in the decision making process may explain conflicting results for 
effects of fairness on payments in PWYW research. Two systems of cognitive processing 
are thought to contribute to judgment and decision making  (Bargh and Chartrand 1999). 
The theory of dual processing states that people naturally use a mental energy 
conservation process aimed at limiting the amount of time spent on cognitive processing 
in the case of minor decisions (Evans and Frankish 2009; Kahneman 2011). The labels 
System 1 and System 2 refer to these processing styles. System 1 processing is quick, 
instinctual, and implicit, whereas System 2 processing is effortful, cognitive, deliberative 
and “rule based” (Evans 2003; Evans 2008). In most instances of decision-making, 
people rely on System 1 processing to guide (Kahneman 2011). Only when decisions are 
difficult and important does the rational and more effortful System 2 take over. It is 
unlikely that System 2 would be naturally engaged when making a small dollar purchase 
such as those in many PWYW contexts. Although highly effective, System 1 relies on 
heuristics, or decision rules, to make quick decisions under uncertainty which can lead to 
suboptimal choices (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  
Assuming self-interest is the automatic first response in decision-making (Moore 
and Loewenstein 2004), then a consumer’s initial response to a PWYW situation would 
be to pay nothing.  This would suggest that justice motives only emerge when self-
interest is actively suppressed. Thus, a reasonable strategy for firms using PWYW would 
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be to encourage consumers to “stop and think” before deciding how much to pay.  The 
effect of this would be to help the consumer resist the immediate urge to act self-
interestedly in favor of acting more justly.  Consider Panera Cares, a PWYW bakery 
which asks consumers to “please leave your fair share,” and reminds them that Panera 
“need(s) your support” and that “you’re on your honor.” Many similar entreaties from 
PWYW firms are meant to make consumers stop, think and consider what is just, in the 
hopes that will results in higher payments, which are more just from the firm’s 
perspective.  
Surprisingly, recent research suggests that quicker decisions yield more generous 
decisions (Lotito, Migheli, and Ortona 2011; Rand et al. 2012). Both ultimatum and 
dictator game proposers gave significantly fairer splits when they made faster decisions 
or when they were playing the game for the first time. Thus, a question emerges as to 
whether a consumer’s first instinct is to act fairly. Whether these higher payments are 
fairer is subjective. However, it is clear that in some cases, consumers making quick 
decisions do not act out of self-interest. It is expected that PWYW payments made under 
conditions of less effort yield higher amounts than those that are made under conditions 
of more effort. Formally:     
H7: When a consumer engages in less (more) effortful decision making, 
anonymous PWYW payments will be higher (lower). 
Study 1 explicitly tested H7 by comparing PWYW payments made by those 
recalling an internal reference price (IRP) information about expected price and about 
value independently. Pretests and study 4 in essay 1 indicate that participants believed 
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that the company would charge a price that was significantly higher than what is was 
worth. If the lower payment amounts observed in study 4 were a result of anchoring on 
recalled IRPs, then separating the questions between subjects should result in higher 
payments in the expected price (vs. worth) condition. However, it was expected that, 
regardless of the type of IRP recalled, payments would decrease when participants exert 
cognitive effort compared to when they are not asked to report IRPs. Both recall 
conditions were expected to report equivalent PWYW payments, which were 
significantly lower than a control group making less effortful payment decisions. In order 
to confirm that findings were a result of effortful cognitive processing rather than 
something specific to recalling and reporting IRP, studies 2, 3 and 4 tested for effects of 
cognitive processing styles using different types of manipulations.   
If supported, H7 does not explain whether less effortful processing leads 
consumers to act more justly. Rather, it indicates that less cognitive effort leads to higher 
payments in PWYW.  Higher PWYW payments may be an indicator of heuristic-based 
decision making. Rand and colleagues (2012) suggested that quicker ultimatum 
distributions are fairer due to a cooperation heuristic rather than increased justice 
concerns. The authors purport that people forced to make distribution decisions quickly 
or those unfamiliar with the game rely on heuristics. The response that System 1 suggests 
is to “do the right thing,” because we have been taught that cooperating with others is the 
right thing to do. However, if one is able or encouraged to stop and think about the rules 
of the game, System 2 processing may lead individuals to deduce there is little rational 
support for being fair and this may override System 1’s suggestion. A similar explanation 
might apply to PWYW payments.  
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Making payment decisions in a PWYW context is likely unfamiliar to most 
consumers. A lifetime of normal purchases has taught us that money is exchanged when 
buying a product. In a PWYW context, the easiest, most available choice that comes to 
mind is to pay an amount that is near the value we expect to pay for the product in a 
normal purchase context. It is expected that when consumers make PWYW payments 
using System 1, those payments are subject to a normal price heuristic, thus leading to 
higher payment amounts. However, when able or encouraged to use System 2, consumers 
may revert to self-interest motivations, which elicit lower PWYW payments.  
If payment differences were the result of a System 1-related reliance on fairness 
motives, participants should report higher importance of factors related to justice, such as 
“paying a fair price,” in payment determination. Factors related to self-interest, such as 
“my own personal financial situation,” should be reported to be less influential. Also, if 
fairness explains higher payments made by those processing more superficially, an 
external reference price (ERP) should be more influential in this condition. This would 
suggest that payments made by participants using System 1 (vs. 2) would make higher 
payments when ERPs are high and lower when ERPs are low. This is not expected. A 
main effect of processing is expected such that System 1 (vs. 2) results in higher 
payments regardless of ERP level. Higher PWYW payments demonstrated under System 
1 are hypothesized to be a result of heuristic-based decision making. Formally,  
H8: PWYW payments made by consumers using System 1 (vs. 2) processing will 
be higher regardless of the level of external reference price information.  
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If supported, H8 suggests that consumers may not be directly motivated by either 
self-interest or justice concerns in low consequence decision making in a PWYW 
context. Prior research indicates that PWYW payments are very low when consequences 
are high (e.g., León, Noguera, and Tena-Sánchez 2012), most likely because the 
temptation is so much greater. For most consumers, it is not as painful to pay $9.99 as it 
would be to pay thousands of dollars for an all-inclusive vacation package, for example. 
It may be that when the normal price for a product or service is high, consumers are 
investing more cognitive effort in PWYW payment determination. Switching to System 2 
processing may lead to the observed decrease in payments. When System 1 guides 
decision making, it may be so quick and automatic that it bypasses more deliberative 
processing. It may be that via product and purchase context, firms have some influence 
on the type of processing a consumer is likely to engage. This leads to important 
implications for firms regarding how to structure PWYW purchases as well as the types 
of products that are appropriate for this strategy.  
Four studies in the current essay tested dual processing and fairness vs. self-
interest motivations for effects on PWYW payments. First, the effect of cognitive 
processing style on PWYW payments was explored. Processing style was manipulated 
using different techniques in each study. The influence of processing style on motivations 
was subsequently tested. Expected higher payments under low cognitive effort may be a 
result of reliance on justice motivations. However, it is expected that higher payments are 
not made out of fairness. Rather, it may be that when making quick decisions, self-
interest is bypassed in favor of heuristic-based decision making. A normal price heuristic 
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leads to increased payments. These studies are described in depth in the following 
section.     
OVERVIEW: STUDIES 1-4 
Four studies were designed to test the hypotheses presented in essay 2. As in 
essay 1, all study contexts involved anonymous payments contexts without any social 
interaction. Studies were approved by the Committee for the Protection of Human 
Subjects (CPHS), which serves as the University of Oregon's Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). The methods, stimuli, procedures and findings are explained in detail below. Table 
1 provides an overview of hypotheses tested by study.  
TABLE 1 
OVERVIEW OF HYPOTHESES TESTED: ESSAY 2 
Study Description Hypotheses Tested 
1 IRP anchoring and Dual Processing H1, H7 
2 Cognitive Load H1, H7 
3 Elaboration and POV  H1, H7 
4 ERPs and Time Restraints H1, H7, H8 
 
STUDY 1: INTERNAL REFERENCE PRICES AND DUAL PROCESSING  
IN A PWYW CONTEXT 
 The purpose of study 1 is to extend findings from study 4 in essay 1. Study 4 may 
suggest that lower PWYW payments are reported when participants recall internal 
reference price (IRP) information. However, it is not possible to determine from that 
study if decreased payments resulted from anchoring or the act of IRP recall. Participants 
in that study reported both how much they thought the company would charge and how 
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much they perceived the service to be worth. If consumers’ payments are anchored on 
reported IRPs, then IRPs would be predictive of payments in the same manner as ERP 
information was found to effect PWYW payment amounts in studies 1-3 in essay 1. In 
the current study, it is hypothesized that the process of effortfully recalling IRP 
information reduces payment amounts. Effortful recall may make it more likely that 
participants are using System 2 processing to determine payment amounts. Therefore, it 
is necessary to test the effects of estimating expected price charged and estimated worth 
separately. Asking participants to report only one IRP estimates between subjects (rather 
than reporting both as was done in the previous study) will provide insight into the 
process by which IRPs influence PWYW payments. Because the two numbers were 
significantly different within subjects in study 4, recalling estimated charge can act as a 
self-reported high IRP condition. One the other hand, reporting estimated worth is 
effectively a self-reported low IRP condition. Additionally, the current study includes a 
manipulation testing whether increasing the salience of fairness has any effect on PWYW 
payments. Although no formal hypothesis is put forth, it seems possible that increasing 
fairness salience may increase PWYW payment amounts.  
Method and Stimuli 
In 2012, 187 participants (mean age = 21.68 years, 57.5% male) were 
undergraduate business majors from a large northwestern university participated in study 
1. They received partial course credit in exchange for participation. Identical to studies 1 
and 4 in essay 1, the current study used the fictitious CLOUDX service (see page 42 for 
full description).  A 2 (fairness: control, salient) x 3 (IRP type: control, high, low) factor 
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between-subjects design was employed. Student identification numbers were checked to 
ensure no one had completed a study using this stimulus previously.   
Procedure 
 Prior to reading the CLOUDX service description, all participants were given a 
writing task designed to appear as a separate study. Half the participants were randomly 
assigned to a fairness priming task. The task was inspired by a question originally posed 
by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) in their investigation of price fairness 
perceptions. Participants were informed that a different university was considering 
changing the manner in which football tickets were distributed to students. The university 
was gathering opinions on the perceived fairness of different options. Participants were 
asked to indicate which of three possible distribution options was the most fair and the 
least fair and to elaborate by providing several reasons why they felt that was so (see 
Appendix D1 for complete wording). Participants assigned to the control condition were 
given a similar task that requested information about the relative time commitments of 
their scholastic, social and work related responsibilities (see Appendix D2 for details).  
After completing the priming task, all participants were informed that they were being 
directed to an ostensibly unrelated study. 
  Next, all participants received the same new service description of CLOUDX and, 
as in studies 1 and 4 in essay 1, an attention check quiz as well as interest and attitude 
measures (see Appendices A1&2). Study 4 essay 1 indicated that estimates of the 
expected price charged (Mall = $15.87, SD = 11.01) was significantly higher than 
perceived worth (Mall = $6.88, SD = 7.76), t(156) = 5.931, p < .001. Therefore, depending 
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on which question is asked, participants were expected to self-generate a higher or lower 
IRP. Those assigned to the high IRP condition were asked to report how much they felt 
the company would charge per month of CLOUDX service. Participants in the low IRP 
condition were asked to report how much per a month of CLOUDX service was worth 
(see Appendices D3&4 for exact wording). Again, it was expected based on prior results 
reported herein that participants tend to think that the company would charge (high IRP 
condition) significantly more than the service was worth (low IRP condition). A control 
condition was not asked to generate any IRP information, but completed all other items.   
Subsequently, all participants were given the standard PWYW pricing explanation 
used in essay 1. There were no ERPs given in this study. After reporting payments, 
participants listed factors that influenced the amount they chose to pay in order of 
importance. They then indicated whether those factors were negative, neutral or positive 
(see Appendix D5). Next, participants completed the same measures reported in essay 1 
regarding the importance of several presented factors (see Appendix B6). Lastly, they 
reported how difficult it was to decide how much to pay on a 7-point Likert scale and 
provided responses to an open-ended item about their thoughts and feelings about 
PWYW. 
Results 
 An independent samples t-test revealed that participants thought that the company 
would charge significantly more (Mcharge = $14.81, SD = 11.80)
 14
 than CLOUDX was 
                                                          
14
 Three participants reported expected price charged as outlier values as indicated by the outlier labeling 
rule. These values were Windsorized to the cut-off value ($44.65).  
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worth (Mworth = $8.64, SD = 6.92)
 15
, t(122) = 3.550, p = .001
16
. The manipulation of self-
generated low and high internal reference price conditions was therefore successful. 
Those participants who reported the internal reference price corresponding to expected 
price charged will henceforth be referred to as the “high IRP” condition. Participants who 
reported how much CLOUDX would be worth will be referred to as the “low IRP” 
condition.  
 Participants reported voluntary payments of $7.20 (SD = 8.45)
17
, which is greater 
than zero, t(186) = 11.652, p < .001. See figure 1 for payments across conditions.  
FIGURE 1 
PWYW PAYMENT MEANS BY IRP CONDITION: STUDY 1 
 
An analysis of variance revealed significant differences in payments across conditions, 
F(5,181) = 6.994, p < .001. There was a main effect of IRP condition indicating that 
people made different payments depending on their IRP level (none, high or low). 
                                                          
15
 Five participants reported worth determined to be outliers by the outlier labeling rule and were 
Windsorized to the cut-off value ($23.58).  
 
16
 There were no differences in perceptions of price charged and worth across fairness manipulations (ps > 
.366) so these conditions were collapsed. 
 
17
 Eight participants reported payments identified as outliers by the labeling rule. These values were 




















However, there was no main effect of fairness salience nor interaction effects, ps > .1. 
Participants who completed the fairness prompt did not report a significantly higher 
importance of fairness (Mfair = 4.50, SD = 1.71) than those completing the control prompt 
(Mcontrol = 4.54, SD = 1.84) in deciding their payment amounts, t(115) = -.129, p = .898. 
This factor was collapsed in subsequent analyses. 
Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the control condition who did not 
report an IRP paid significantly more (Mcontrol = $11.61, SD = 11.42) compared to those 
in the high IRP (Mhigh = $5.35, SD = 5.19) and the low IRP ($4.58 SD = 5.27) conditions, 
F(2,184) = 15.01, p < .001.  Importantly, there was no significant difference in voluntary 
payments between participants in the high and low IRP conditions, p = .585.  
Discussion 
 It was expected that a fairness manipulation may have a positive impact on 
payments across IRP conditions. Two possibilities of why this effect was not found are 
discussed herein. The first is that in this context, increasing the salience of fairness may 
not encourage people to make higher PWYW payments. The second is that the 
manipulation of fairness salience was not successful. Although the proxy manipulation 
check indicated that the fairness prompt did not increase the importance to participants of 
paying a fair price, it is unclear whether the salience of fairness in general was affected 
by the prompt. In order to test this, study 2 will utilize a new manipulation because the 
notion that concern for fairness should increase voluntary payments is quite intuitive and 
often assumed in PWYW settings. It is important to continue exploring this relationship.   
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 The results of study 4 in essay 1 were extended in the current study by explicitly 
testing whether the cognitively effortful act of generating internal reference prices 
suppresses voluntary payments or whether participants were simply anchoring on self-
generated values. Because participants in the high and low IRP conditions paid 
equivalent and lower amounts, it is likely that it is not the face value of the self-generated 
number that matters in determining how much to pay. Rather, the act of generating price 
information appears to be suppressing payment amounts. This study provides preliminary 
support for H7 which suggests that those more cognitively involved in price 
determination tend to pay lower amounts. It appears that participants who did not 
effortfully recall and report IRPs may be using System 1 processing and this is increasing 
payment amounts. When participants use System 2 processing by considering factors 
such as internal reference price information, payments are suppressed. Study 2 further 
tests this hypothesis by using a different manipulation of processing style. It is possible 
that payments are in this study are lowered by a process idiosyncratic to recalling internal 
reference price information. Study 2 attempts to generalize this finding to not only 
internal reference price recall, but to a broader processes of System 2 processing.    
 
STUDY 2: COGNITVE LOAD EFFECTS ON PWYW PAYMENT AMOUNTS 
Study 2 was designed to find additional support for H7 which predicting that 
consumers who use less effortful processing tend to make higher PWYW payments. 
Findings from study 1 demonstrated this pattern but it could be a result specific to 
recalling IRP information. It is important, therefore, to test other cognitive processing 
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style manipulations. In study 2, participants were made cognitively busy or left 
unconstrained in order to test whether those who are using System 1 processing make 
higher payments, similar to those in the control condition in study 1 in the current essay. 
Additionally, a different fairness manipulation was included in order to support study 1. 
The fairness salience manipulation in study 1 did not affect voluntary payment amounts, 
but this may have been due to the specific manner in which it was tested. This 
manipulation focused on priming either egotistic or altruistic appeals to test whether 
fairness appeals encourage more fair (higher) payments (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, 
Buckley and Birch 1981). Although intuitively appealing, it was not expected that 
fairness appeals would increase voluntary payments based on findings from study 1. One 
final procedural difference was that in this study participants could refrain from buying 
CLOUDX. This change was meant to remove the influence of those who would not buy 
the service in a real context.  
Method and Stimuli 
During fall quarter of 2012, 338 undergraduate business majors from a large 
northwestern university (mean age = 21.43 years, 60.99% male) completed study 2 in 
exchange for partial course credit. The study design was a randomized between-subjects 
3 (Fairness: egotistic, altruistic, control) x 2 (Cognitive Load: low, high) factor design. 
An ERP of $9.99 was given in all conditions. Additionally, the design allowed for 






The instructions, CLOUDX description, attention check quiz and attitude 
measures were similar to study 1. However, after reading the standard CLOUDX service 
description, all participants were informed that the price for the basic service was $9.99 
per month. This price was selected because it is below what prior participants had 
expected the company to charge and close to previously reported worth. Participants all 
completed the same evaluations and attitude measures as previously described. Next, in 
order to confirm the price was perceived as fair, participants completed a general measure 
and a three-item 7-point Likert scale regarding price perceptions (Cronbach’s α = .86; see 
Appendices E1&2 for full measures). All were thanked for their feedback and informed 
the study was complete.  
 Next, participants were directed to what appeared to be a separate study testing 
memory skills. Cognitive load was manipulated using a letter-string memory task (cf. 
Gilbert and Hixon 1991). Letters were used rather than numbers to avoid anchoring 
effects. Participants were instructed they would be shown a random string of letters for 
20 seconds and would be asked to recall it approximately five minutes later after 
completing an unrelated study (see Appendix E3 for complete instructions). Participants 
in the low cognitive load condition saw a three letter string (DTP) and high load 
conditions were given an eight letter string (HRNFLRGM). Strings were generated from 
a random letter generator using only consonants. Those under high load (more difficult 
memory task) were expected to rely on System 1 processing when determining a payment 
amount.  Participants under a low cognitive load (easier memory task) were expected to 
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engage in System 2 processing. After a 20-second exposure to the letter string, 
participants were automatically forwarded to the next study.  
 Participants were then asked to recall the information they were given earlier 
regarding CLOUDX. Participants in a control condition were given the same description 
of PWYW pricing as in previous studies (see Appendix E4). Although participants had 
been informed that CLOUDX normally was priced at $9.99, this prompt explained that 
the company was alternatively considering offering it under a “Pick Your Price” strategy. 
Two different fairness primes were randomly assigned between participants to test the 
influence of altruistic and egotistic motives (based on Bateson et al. 1981) on PWYW 
payments. The egotistical fairness appeal condition included a statement reading 
“Research finds that paying a fair price makes people feel good about themselves” to the 
control condition script. Alternately, the altruistic fairness appeal condition informed 
participants “Research finds that paying a fair price allows the company to stay in 
business so that its services can also be used by others.”  Subsequently, all participants 
were asked to imagine the same purchase scenario described in the control condition in 
study 1 essay 2 and imagined visiting the website to purchase a month of CLOUDX 
service. Participants then indicated whether they would choose to buy CLOUDX by 
making a PWYW payment or refrain from purchase (see Appendix E5 for wording).  
Those opting out were asked a series of questions regarding why they refrained from 
making the purchase (see Appendix E6 for full questions) and then directed to the letter 
recall section.  
 Participants who opted in reported their selected prices as well as identical 
dependent measures included in study 1 essay 2. They also reported their best guess as to 
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what others would pay for CLOUDX. After completing the last open-ended response 
regarding their thoughts and feelings about PWYW, participants were told the study was 
complete.  
 After completing the main section of the study, all participants were instructed to 
report back the letters they were given earlier. To ensure the cognitive load manipulation 
was successful, all indicated how difficult it was to remember the letters (see Appendix 
E7 for full questions). Participants were thanked and directed to an unrelated study.  
Results 
Participants reported moderately positive attitudes regarding CLOUDX (Mall = 
4.56 on 5 item, 7 pt Likert scale, SD = 1.11, Cronbach’s α = .856).  The stated price 
($9.99) was reported to be neither fair nor unfair (Mall = 3.34, 7 pt Likert scale, SD = 
1.65) and moderately expensive (Mall = 4.44, 7 pt Likert scale, SD = 1.22). Of 338 
participants, 148 (43.8%) opted out of buying CLOUDX under PWYW pricing. Those 
participants who opted out of purchase had significantly less favorable attitudes about 
CLOUDX (Mout = 4.07, SD = 1.11) compared to those who opted to buy CLOUDX (Min 
= 4.95, SD = 0.96) and provide a voluntary payment, t(336) = -7.751, p < .001. Further, 
those opting out of purchase were relatively evenly spread across conditions (see table 2). 
The percentage of participants opting out v. in was not statistically different based on 
cognitive load conditions (
2
(1) = 2.356, p = .125) or by fairness manipulation (
 2
(2) = 






CONDITIONAL FREQUENCIES OF OPTING IN / OUT: STUDY 2  
 
After opting out of purchase, participants again reported their interest level in 
CLOUDX service (Mout_post = 2.90, SD = 1.56). This was compared with their initial 
interest level (Mout_initial = 3.68, SD = 1.63) to test for changes in interest attributable to 
learning that the payment was voluntary. A paired sample t-test indicated that for those 
who opted out there was a significant decrease in interest in CLOUDX after learning they 
would select their own price, t(147) = 7.00, p < .001. Participants further reported the 
reason they opted out of purchase
18
 (see figure 2).  
FIGURE 2 
REASONS FOR OPTING OUT: STUDY 2 
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 One participant indicated s/he did not mean to opt out and was removed from analysis concerning 






















felt bad other confusion skeptical
Pre-coding
Post-Coding




Opted in 190 (56.2%) 65 (34.2%) 56 (29.5%) 69 (36.3%)  88 (46.3%) 120 (53.7%) 
Opted out 148 (43.8%) 48 (32.4%) 57 (38.5%) 43 (29.1%)  81 (54.7% 67 (45.3%) 
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Participants selecting “other” provided open ended responses regarding their 
reasoning for refraining from purchase. “Post-coding” columns in figure 2 above include 
these individuals in the counts. Further qualitative analysis of the open ended responses 
indicated that 15 participants were not interested in the service and 5 indicated they did 
not understand PWYW or the service. The remaining 15 participants (or 4.44% of the 
total sample), reported being skeptical of PWYW, with statements such as “seemed too 
good to be true,” “wary, no company would do that,” and “felt like a scam.”  Those 
opting out reported they guessed others would voluntarily pay $5.57 (SD = 5.65) on 
average for a month of CLOUDX service. Those who opted in estimated others would 
report similar payment amounts (Min =  $5.65, SD = 5.11; t(335) = .129, p = .898.  
Participants were then asked to report back the letter string given in the cognitive 
load manipulation. Four participants did not attempt to recall the letter string and were 
removed from further analysis. All participants in the low cognitive load condition 
correctly recall the three letter string; however, only 48.75% in the high cognitive load 
condition were able to correctly recalled the seven letter string (
 2
(1) = 45.86, p < .001). 
Further, participants in the high (vs. low) load condition reported it was more difficult 
(Mhigh = 3.66, SD = 0.73; Mlow = 1.44, SD = 1.86; t(142) = -9.01, p < .001) and required 
more effort (Mhigh = 4.33, SD = 1.57; Mlow = 2.20, SD = 1.27; t(142) = -8.766, p < .001). 
Participants in the high (vs. low) load conditions reported trying harder to remember the 
letters (Mhigh = 4.85, SD = 1.42; Mlow = 3.14, SD = 1.62; t(142) = -6.75, p < .001). 
Interestingly, there was no difference in the time spent on the survey overall (Mhigh = 6 
minutes 34 seconds, SD = 1.80; Mlow = 6 minutes 32 seconds, SD = 1.69; t(142) = .495, p 
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= 0.621). This suggests that although participants in the high load were cognitively 
busier, they did not rush or decide more quickly.  
For participants who opted to purchase CLOUDX, the mean payment was $3.86 
(SD = 3.81)
19
. This is somewhat lower than the mean payment reported in study 1 which 
may be attributable to the $9.99 reference price provided to all participants in this study 
(see figure 3). Analysis of variance revealed marginally significant differences in 
payment amounts between fairness and cognitive load conditions F(5,183) = 1.89, p = 
.098. There was a main effect of cognitive load on payments, F(1,183) = 4.423, p = .037. 
As expected, participants under high cognitive load paid relatively higher amounts (Mhigh 
= $4.50, SD = 4.99) compared with those under low load (Mlow = $3.31, SD = 2.24). 
FIGURE 3 
PWYW PAYMENT MEANS BY COGNITIVE LOAD CONDITION: STUDY 2 
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 Two participants reported payments identified as outliers by the labeling rule (Hoaglin, Iglewicz and 
Tukey, 1986). These values were Windsorized to the cell means plus two SDs (Field 2005). 
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Similar to study 1, there was no significant main effect or interactions related to the 
fairness manipulation (all ps > .26). As in the previous study, it is possible that this 
manipulation did not effectively manipulate fairness salience. However, the repeated lack 
of support may also cast doubt on the importance of fairness in PWYW pricing in the 
context of for-profit companies. Accordingly, study 3 utilizes a trait measure of fairness 
(Belief in Just World) rather than a fairness salience manipulation. Measuring trait 
fairness should provide further insight into the role of fairness motivations on PWYW 
payments. Subsequent analysis in the current study collapses across fairness prime 
conditions.  
 When asked to report factors considered when determining how much to pay, 
participants (n = 189) reported a total of 587 discrete thoughts/factors considered, for an 
average of approximately 3 reported thoughts per participant. There was no difference in 
number of factors reported across cognitive load conditions (t(187) = 1.098, p = 274). In 
addition to open ended responses, participants rated the importance of seven provided 
decision making factors, which significantly varied, F(6,1316) = 59.125, p < .001 (see 
figure 4).  
FIGURE 4 
IMPORTANCE OF DECISION MAKING FACTORS: STUDY 2 
 

























 Although the pattern is slightly different than in previous studies, the key take 
away remains unchanged. Post hoc analysis again demonstrated that self-focused reasons 
(such as personal finances and getting a good deal) were reported as significantly more 
important than concern for justice or the company’s well-being. The two factors directly 
related to the company (“the normal price the company would charge” and “the cost to 
the company of providing the service”) are significantly less important than all other 
factors, all ps < .001. Participants reported that it was a relatively easy to determine how 
much to pay (Mall =  4.89, SD = 1.35; no difference across load conditions t(187) = 1.375, 
p > .1). 
 Finally, participants attempted to report back the three or seven character letter 
string. Only 3 participants did not attempt to recall the letter string and were removed 
from further analysis. Consistent with the opt out group, participants who reported 
payments under cognitive load were better able to correctly recall the three character 
letter string (99%) compared to those under high cognitive load who could correctly 
recall the seven character letter string (62.5%), 
 2
(1) = 41.31, p < .001. Those under high 
load reported the memory task to be more difficult (Mhigh= 3.57, SD = 1.90; Mlow= 1.48, 
SD = .82) and requiring more effort (Mhigh= 4.25, SD = 1.39; Mlow= 2.31, SD = 1.31) 
compared to those in the low load (t(184) = -9.92, p <.001 and t(184) = -9.81, p <.001, 
respectively). Participants in the low load condition reported exerting less effort to 
remember (Mlow= 2.93, SD = 1.56) compared to those in the high load condition (Mhigh= 
4.59, SD = 1.44). Again, there were no differences in overall time spent taking the survey 
(Mhigh= 9 minutes 56 seconds, SD = 2.31 and Mlow= 9 minutes 58 seconds, SD = 2.43; 
t(186) = -.058, p = .953). Additionally no significant difference in time spent deliberating 
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over payment (Mhigh= 11.96 seconds, SD = 5.64 and Mlow= 11.76 seconds, SD = 8.31; 
t(157
20
) = -.177, p = .860) were observed. The fact that those in the high load did not 
decide faster may suggest that slower decisions do not necessarily indicate System 2 
processing is utilized in those cases. Subsequent studies in this dissertation will explore 
whether fast decisions demonstrate the same pattern as decisions made under high 
cognitive load.   
Discussion 
 Study 2 provided additional support for H7. Participants under a high cognitive 
load chose higher voluntary payments than those under a lower cognitive load. Cognitive 
load hinders System 2 (deliberate, rational) processing. Results demonstrate that 
participants using System 1 processing (quick, heuristic) are willing to voluntarily pay 
more. Combined with results from study 1 where processing was manipulated by 
recalling internal reference prices, confidence is bolstered that increased processing tends 
to suppress payments. However, further research is needed to investigate whether these 
payments are higher because they are more influenced by increased reliance on heuristic 
decision making (anchoring on the $9.99 external reference prices in this case) or if faster 
decision makers are more just in their payment determination. The final two studies in 
this dissertation continue to explore these processes.   
Further, the design of study 2 allowed participants to refrain from purchase. It was 
important to explore whether people who wanted to engage in a PWYW purchase 
demonstrated similar payment patterns to those observed in previous studies. The same 
                                                          
20
 An apparent glitch in the reporting software caused some participant’s time on the payment 
determination screen to not be recorded. This was spread evenly across conditions.  
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pattern among those who indicated they would engage in PWYW was observed in this 
study. Such results offer greater support for the applicability of this research to business 
strategy. Finally, the discovery that those who were less interested in the service tended 
to opt out rather than paying a small amount or nothing should be reassuring to firms 
considering PWYW strategies.    
 
STUDY 3: ELABORATION AND POINT-OF-VIEW EFFECTS ON PWYW 
PAYMENT AMOUNTS 
 The purpose of study 3 was to support findings from studies 1 and 2 using an 
alternate processing manipulation. Study 3 also tested for differences in the type of 
elaboration the consumer engages in. It is possible that determining PWYW payments by 
engaging in System 2 processing may cause consumers to be naturally inclined to think 
about the benefits of acting self-interestedly. This, in turn, would lead to lower reported 
payments. If consumers are specifically encouraged to elaborate on the benefits of paying 
fair prices, then System 2 processing may instead lead to higher reported payments. 
Study 3 manipulated not only the type of cognitive processing (System 1 or System 2) 
between subjects, but also the point of view (self or firm) and the type of elaboration 
(justice, self-interest or undirected). Point of view is manipulated due to concerns that 
prior fairness manipulations (particularly in study 1) may have resulted in a self-focused 
orientation. Additionally, an individual difference measure of belief in a just world is 
included in order to test for trait influences on PWYW payments. If higher payments 
made under System 1 processing are due to a normal price heuristic as hypothesized, 
neither the nature of the elaboration task nor justice concerns should affect payments. A 
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main effect of elaboration is expected in that those elaborating will pay less than those 
who are not.  
Method and Stimuli 
 In spring quarter 2013, 328 undergraduate students (mean age = 21.32, 60.6% 
male) at a large northwestern university participated in study 3 in exchange for partial 
course credit. The stimuli (CLOUDX) is identical to studies 1 and 2. The study is a 2 
(Point of View: self, firm) x 3 (Elaboration: justice, self-interest, control) factor between 
subjects design. Two additional conditions, a control group where participants make 
payments without any manipulation and a group instructed to make payment decisions 
quickly are also tested. There was no option of opting out of PWYW in this study.  
Procedure 
 Prior to the main study, all participants completed a scale measuring their level of 
belief in a just world (BJWS; adapted from Rubin and Peplau 1975; see Appendix F1 for 
full scale). After completing the BJWS, participants completed other unrelated studies for 
approximately 10 minutes before proceeding to the main section of study 3. Participants 
progressed through the study in a manner similar to the control condition described in 
study 1 of essay 2. No ERPs were presented in this study. Participants were given the 
same CLOUDX information, quiz and attitude measures as used in previous studies. All 
read the usual description of PWYW pricing and were asked to imagine that they want to 
buy the service for a month. The payment prompt is identical to previous studies (see 
page 45). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of eight conditions.  
110 
 
 Only those in the control condition proceeded directly to enter their payment 
amounts. An additional non-elaborating group was instructed to go with their first instinct 
and report payment amount as quickly as possible (see Appendix F2). Participants in the 
elaboration conditions were first instructed to take at least two minutes to think about 
how much they would pay for CLOUDX. During this time the screen was held for 120 
seconds and they could not advance. Participants were asked to imagine either they were 
1) about to purchase CLOUDX for their own personal use (self POV) or 2) that they were 
employees at a firm considering releasing CLOUDX under a PWYW strategy (firm 
POV). These POVs were selected as it is intuitive that those in the self POV might act in 
more self-interest and those in the firm POV may consider acting more fairly toward the 
firm. They were further instructed to write down either factors considered when 
determining payments (undirected condition), reasons for paying a fair amount (justice 
condition), or reasons for paying little or nothing (self-interest condition; see Appendix 
F3 for full details).  
Following the elaboration manipulation, all participants reported payment 
amounts. The same dependent measures related to the importance of factors in decision 
making were collected (again, see Appendix B6). In addition, processing items used in 
study 2 essay 1 were included to ensure the success of the cognitive processing 
manipulation (see Appendix B7). As in study 1 of essay 2, participants reported liking of 
and preference for PWYW, as well as open-ended responses regarding their thoughts and 





 Participants first completed the Belief in Just World scale which was purportedly 
independent from the main study. The seven item scale was reliable (Cronbach’s α = 
.797). Participants reported a somewhat neutral mean score (M = 3.91, SD = .947), 
indicating that in general participants were not extreme in their beliefs about whether the 
world is just or not. Scale values ranged from 1 (indicating a complete lack of belief in a 
just world) to 5.86 (out of 7), see figure 5 for frequencies. Participants then completed an 
unrelated study lasting approximately 10 minutes before beginning the main study.  
 
FIGURE 5 
BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD SCALE DISTRIBUTION: STUDY 3 
 
Participants read the usual introduction of CLOUDX and reported their interest 
and attitudes. Again, interest level (Mall = 4.66 SD = 1.73) and attitudes (Mall = 4.76, SD = 
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conditions (n = 261) then spent at least 2 minutes responding to their respective prompt. 
Responses were analyzed to determine whether the participant was elaborating correctly 
based on condition.  Specifically, if the participant mentioned at least one factor that 
demonstrated the correct POV (“I” vs. from the business’ POV) and indicated the correct 
type of elaboration (pay a fair price vs. pay little or nothing), then she or he was retained.  
Participants who failed to meet this standard were not retained. In total 31 respondents 
were not included in the analysis. The 230 remaining participants in the elaboration 
conditions spent an average of 2 minutes and 24 seconds (SD = 29.15) thinking and 
writing about motivations for voluntary payments.  
 The mean voluntary payment across conditions was $6.99, SD = 7.81
21
. Multiple 
regression revealed that belief in a just world was predictive of payment amounts, 
explaining 1.9% of the variance in payments (R
2
 = .019, F(1,315) = 6.004, p = .015).  
Participants who had a greater belief in a just world tended to make larger voluntary 
payments (β = 1.12, p = .015). Accordingly, BJWS score was included as a covariate.  
Participants reported a mean payment of $6.99 (SD = 7.81) for one month of 
CLOUDX, which is significantly above zero, t(315) = 15.94, p < .001. See figure 6 for 
conditional means.  Payment amounts for the two non-elaboration (Mcontrol = $6.35, SD = 
8.32 and Mquick = $8.39, SD = 11.86) conditions were not significantly different from one 
another, t(85) = .931, p = .355.  
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 Eleven participants’ reported payment amounts were detected as outliers based on the outlier labeling 




PWYW PAYMENT MEANS BY  
POV AND ELABORATION CONDITION: STUDY 3 
 
Participants in the quick decision condition indicated their payment amounts significantly 
faster (Mquick = 11.02 seconds, SD = 5.78) than did those in the control condition (Mcontrol 
= 16.43 seconds, SD = 11.16), t(85) = 2.829, p = .006. This indicates that even though 
decisions were made more quickly, there may not be differences in processing styles. 
Additionally, post hoc testing on processing measures used as manipulation checks 
revealed few significant differences between conditions (see table 3). It does not appear 
that processing style was significantly different between the control and quick-decision 
conditions. More importantly, because of the lack of significant differences in processing 
between elaboration and non-elaborating conditions, we are unable to conclude that those 































T-VALUES FOR PROCESSING DIFFERENCES BY CONDITION: STUDY 3 
                           Processing Items 






Thought a lot 
Quick v. Control .704 (.482) 3.074 (.002) .639 (.523) -2.170 (.031) 
Control v. Elab .481 (.631) 1.881 (.061) 1.160 (.247) -1.322 (.187) 
Quick v. Elab -.432 (.666) -2.104 (.036) .324 (.746) 1.492 (.137) 
 
Further, post hoc testing revealed there were no significant differences in payment 
amounts between either control or quick conditions and all elaboration conditions, all ps 
> .110.  
 Considering only the six target conditions, analysis of variance revealed a 
significant difference in payment amounts across conditions F(5,224) = 3.470, p = .005 
and BJW was not significant, F(1,223) = 1.211, p = .272 . There was no main effect of 
point of view in that those who elaborated from the “self” perspective reported payments 
(Mself = $6.77, SD = 6.71) that were no different than those who elaborated from the 
company’s perspective (Mcompany = $6.94, SD = 6.72), F(1,223) = .270, p = .604. There 
was however a main effect of elaboration type (F(2,223) = 5.486, p = .005). There was 
also a significant interaction between POV and elaboration type (F(2,223) = 3.553, p = 
.030). Post hoc analysis revealed that there were no differences in elaboration type when 
the participants were in the self-mindset (ps > .8). However, when participants took the 
perspective of the company and elaborated on self-interest, they paid significantly less 
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(Mco_selfinterest = $3.76, SD = 4.25) than did those that elaborated on either justice (Mco_justice 
= $9.37, SD = 7.31; p = .005) or in an undirected manner (Mco_neutral = $8.51, SD = 7.24; p 
= .022;  see figure 7).   
FIGURE 7 
INTERACTION OF POV AND ELABORATION ON PWYW PAYMENTS: STUDY 3 
 
 The results indicate that elaborating about self-interested motives of making a 
small PWYW payment only decreased payment amounts when participants took the 
perspective of the company. It is possible that when in the self-mindset, participants felt 
self-imposed pressure to do the right thing and make higher payments, whereas the 
company perspective made it seem acceptable to make lower payments.  
Discussion 
 Findings from this study do not support H7. It is probable that this was because 
the elaboration manipulation failed to influence processing styles. In light of results from 
























decisions did not report larger payments than did those who did not receive any such 
instructions. It is possible that even though participants in the “quick” conditions did 
make faster decisions, both groups nevertheless used System 1 processing. This 
interpretation is in line with the assumption that those in the control conditions were 
indeed using System 1 processing. However, because those in the elaboration conditions 
were apparently not using System 2 processing, it is not possible to support the 
processing hypothesis. Yet, there were significant differences in payment amounts across 
conditions and it is important to address why this may have been. Because companies 
often create appeals meant to encourage consumers to voluntarily pay more in PWYW 
situations, it may be important to consider the mindset induced by the appeal. Asking 
consumers to think from the company’s point of view may have negative effects on 
payment amounts in some cases.  
 The point-of-view manipulation was included to test whether previous fairness 
manipulations in studies 1 and 2 may have unintentionally made salient a self-focused 
mindset. The results of the current study indicate that inducing a self-focused mindset 
does not reduce payment amounts. It was expected that regardless of what participants 
were elaborating on, elaboration would reduce PWYW payment amounts. Although this 
was not supported in the data, it should be noted that inducing a justice elaboration was 
also not effective in increasing voluntary payment amounts in this study. This is 
reminiscent of findings from studies 1 and 2 in essay 2. Interestingly, an individual 
difference measure of belief in a just world was positively correlated with payment 
amounts. This indicates that while fairness concerns may indeed influence amount paid, 
117 
 
such concerns represent stable traits that are not easily altered by the firm in a PWYW 
context.  
 It is also important to note that participants elaborating on self-interest from a 
company perspective reported lower payment amounts than all other conditions. It is 
possible that elaborating on self-interest from the company standpoint relieved self-
imposed pressure to pay a higher amount. The combination of company POV and self-
interest manipulations may have caused participants to rationalize their lower payments 
because the company expects customers to act in self-interest. This indicates that self-
interest motivations may play a complex role in voluntary payments when such motives 
are made salient. This relationship should be explored in future research. It may be that 
those in a self-focused mindset are less influenced by elaborating on self-interested 
motives. More likely is that the company perspective provided some sort of fairness 
“pass,” where participants thought that companies expected some individuals to pay little 
or nothing. It is also possible that appealing to fairness motives causes a backlash or 
reactance effect. In asking consumers to be fair, firms may unintentionally remind 
consumers how firms can be unfair, manipulative and persuasive in these types of 
contexts.  
These findings also have important implications for businesses. There is no 
evidence that encouraging consumers to do the right thing will increase voluntary 
payment amounts. Elaboration did in fact reduce payments, although only when 
elaboration on self-interest motives from the company POV. No type of elaboration 
tested in this study resulted in higher reported payments. Firms should be very cautious in 
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when imploring consumers to be “fair” considering it may have the opposite effect on 
payments desired.  
 
STUDY 4: TIME CONSTRAINTS AND ERP EFFECTS ON  
PWYW PAYMENT AMOUNTS 
 Study 4 was designed to support findings from studies 1 and 2 in the current essay 
utilizing a final cognitive processing style manipulation. Because study 3 found only 
partial support for the theory that System 2 processing leads to lower voluntary payment 
amounts, it is important to continue to explore this relationship. In addition to testing for 
dual processing effects on payments, study 4 was expected to provide insight into the 
reason why payments are higher when participants use System 1 processing. By 
including different ERP levels (similar to studies in essay 1 testing for anchoring effects) 
as well as time constraints, it is possible to test whether those making quick decisions pay 
more in order to be fair or simply because it is cognitively easier. As in studies 1 and 2, it 
was hypothesized that there would be a main effect in that those utilizing System 1 
processing would make higher PWYW payments. Anchoring effects are also expected so 
that regardless of processing type, those presented with higher ERPs will make higher 
payments. If high payments observed under System 1 (vs. 2) processing stem from 
increased concern for fairness, payments should remain relatively higher at all ERP levels 
(not present, low and high). However, an interaction was expected such that when ERP 
information is high or not present, System 1 (vs. 2) processing will result in higher 
payments. When ERPs are low (vs. high or not present), no differences were expected in 
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payment amounts across processing level. If supported, it would indicate that System 1 
payments are a result of heuristic-based decision making. When System 1 is engaged and 
there is no ERP present, one relies on the normal price (how much they would expect to 
pay) to determine a PWYW payment amount. If, however, an ERP is present, it is 
cognitively easier to use that number and therefore is more influential in determining 
PWYW payments. When System 2 is engaged, regardless of ERPs, consumers were 
expected to demonstrate more selfish tendencies by offering a lower payment amount.   
Method and Stimuli 
 In spring 2014, 277 participants (mean age = 32.4 years, ranging from 19 to 74; 
64.26% male) located in the United States were recruited with Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and completed the study (mean completion time of 6 minutes and 27 seconds) and were 
compensated 55 cents. The method and stimuli (CLOUDX) in this study are very similar 
to previously described studies. Study 4 was a 3 (Time: control, pressure, delay) by 3 
(ERP level: absent, low, high) factor randomized between subjects design. All ERPs are 
presented as injunctive norms in the form of suggested prices.     
Procedure   
All participants were given the standard CLOUDX description, quiz, attitude 
measures and PWYW pricing information. All were asked to imagine they would like to 
buy CLOUDX. When participants advanced to the payment screen they were randomly 
assigned to one of six time and ERP level conditions.  Those in control time conditions 
proceeded to the standard payment screen and entered payment as described in all 
previous studies herein. Participants in the time pressure (System 1) condition were 
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instructed they had only 5 seconds to decide how much to pay and to enter their payment 
as quickly as possible. A timer that counted down from 5 to 0 was displayed. Alternately, 
those in the time delay (System 2 processing) conditions were told they could not submit 
payments for 20 seconds (with a timer counting up from 0 to 20) and instructed to use the 
time to think about how much they wanted to pay. See Appendix G1 for screenshots of 
all timing conditions. ERP level was manipulated in an identical manner to studies 
presented in essay 1; participants in the low ERP conditions were given a suggested price 
of $9.99 and participants in the high ERP level conditions were given $24.99 as a 
suggested price. After entering payments, all participants completed the standard 
dependent measures, identical to those described in study 3 essay 2. Three additional 
manipulation check items were included (see Appendix G2). Participants finally reported 
basic demographic information and were provided with a random number to submit for 
compensation. Participants were thanked for their time and effort. 
Results  
Eleven participants missed an attention check item and were removed from the 
analysis. Evaluations of CLOUDX (mean interest = 4.48, SD = 1.56; mean attitude = 
4.81, SD = 1.06, Cronbach’s α = .82) were moderately high and consistent with previous 
studies. An analysis of variance of time spent on the payment screen before entering an 
amount across time conditions confirmed that the time manipulation was successful 
F(2,262) = 196.14, p > .001. Post hoc analysis revealed that those in control conditions 
spent significantly more time reporting payments (Mcontrol = 13.09 seconds, SD = 7.51) 
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than did those under time pressure (Mpressure = 7.37 seconds
22
, SD = 1.31; t(260) = 4.79, p 
< .001) and significantly less than those under delay (Mdelay = 30.24 seconds, SD = 11.58; 
t(260)= -14.20, p < .001). Additionally, ANOVA across time conditions on a self-report 
of how rushed they felt in deciding how much to pay revealed significant differences. 
Those participants in the time pressure conditions felt significantly more rushed (Mpressure 
= 1.64, SD = 1.21) than did those in the control (Mcontrol = 5.98, SD = 1.34; t(260) = 20.66, 
p < .001) and delay (Mpressure = 5.72, SD = 1.61; t(260) = 19.38, p < .001). There was no 
difference between control and delay conditions (t(260) = 1.21, p = .228). The majority 
of participants were able to correctly recall whether or not they saw a suggested price, 
with only four (4.7%) who did not see a suggested price incorrectly reporting that they 
did and 9 (5.1%) who did see a suggested price reporting that they did not. Further, only 
2 (1.1%) of those who correctly reported seeing a suggested price were unable to 
correctly report the correct price that they were given. All of these individuals were 
retained in the analysis because it is possible that regardless if the numbers were 
remembered, they might nevertheless have an unconscious influence on payment 
amounts. 
The mean voluntary payment for one month of CLOUDX service was $7.97 (SD 
= 8.04), ranging from zero to a high payment of $30.00
23
. Approximately 9.5% of 
participants reported a payment amount of zero dollars
24
 for CLOUDX. In conditions 
                                                          
22
 Mean time spent in pressure condition is over the 5 second limit, indicating that some participants were 
unable to decide in 5 seconds. If a participant took more than 5 seconds to enter a payment, an error 
message appeared directing them to enter payment immediately.   
 
23
 Fourteen participants reported monthly payments that were outliers according to the labeling rule. These 
payments were adjusted to the cut-off values (Fields 2005).  
 
24
 Although above zero, three more participants reported extremely low payments under $1.  
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with suggested ERPs, 23 participants (12.9%) opted to pay the suggested amount and 
participants that did so where more likely to be those under time pressure (53%). 
Analysis of variance revealed voluntary payments were significantly different across time 
pressure and ERP conditions, F(8, 254) = 66.61, p < .001 (see figure 8).  
There was a significant effect of ERP level, F(2,262) = 8.337, p <.001. Planned 
contrasts indicated that those provided with a higher suggested price paid significantly 
more (Mhigh_ERP = $10.69, SD = 8.38) than did those not given a suggested price (Mno_ERP 
= $6.73, SD = 7.36; t(260) = 3.34, p = .001) and those given a low suggested price, 
(Mlow_ERP = $6.42, SD = 7.67; t(260) = 3.64, p < .001). This finding supports results 
reported in essay 1 demonstrating the anchoring effects of ERPs on voluntary payments. 
There was no difference in payment amounts between those given a low ERP and those 
who did not receive a suggested price, t(260) = .263, p = .793. 
FIGURE 8 



























There was no main effect of time pressure (F(2,254) = .830, p = .447), thus indicating 
that those who determined payments under time pressure (Mpressure = $8.75, SD = 9.96), 
did not pay significantly more than did either those who were delayed (Mdelay = $7.81, SD 
= 6.89) or those placed under no time constraint (Mcontrol = $7.31, SD = 6.77). Although 
the pattern of payment amounts was directionally consistent with the hypothesis, H7 was 
not supported. No significant interaction was found between ERP conditions and time 
constraint conditions (F(4,254) = 1.303, p = .269). Importantly, it does appear that time 
pressure was related to System 1 processing. Planned contrasts indicated that those under 
time pressure reported stronger agreement (Mpressure = 5.32, SD = 1.23) with the System 1 
processing item “I went with my gut” than did control (Mcontrol = 4.83, SD = 1.53; t(260) = 
2.28, p = .023) and marginally more than delay conditions (Mdelay = 4.91, SD = 1.55; 
t(260) = 1.91, p = .057). For the System 2 item “I considered several factors,” those under 
time pressure reported less agreement (Mpressure = 4.28, SD = 1.74) than did those in either 
the control (Mcontrol = 4.87, SD = 1.46; t(260) = 2.60, p = .010) or the delay condition 
(Mdelay = 5.08, SD = 1.33 t(260) = 3.49, p = .001). However, there were no significant 
differences on processing items between control and time delay conditions, ps >.37. This 
suggests that those in the time delay conditions were not necessarily utilizing System 2 
processing.    
Discussion 
 Although statistical support was not found for either H7 or H8, the findings are 
nevertheless interesting. There was an expected main effect of ERP level in that a high 
suggested price in this case increased payment amounts more than did a low price or no-
suggested price information condition. The effect of anchoring on injunctive (“ought to”) 
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norms demonstrated in essay 1 of the current dissertation was again observed. However, 
findings in essay 1 indicated that a low suggested price may have suppressed payment 
amount compared to an absence of numeric information and such an effect was not 
demonstrated in the current study.  
It was expected that those using System 1 processing would be more influenced 
by the provided ERP, demonstrating increased heuristic-based decision making. As 
shown in figure 9, the pattern of payment amounts across conditions suggests that the 
predicted pattern was observed. 
FIGURE 9 
PWYW PAYMENT MEANS BY TIME RESTRAINTS: STUDY 4 
 
Participants in the control conditions with no time constraints behaved similarly to those 
under delay in that payments with no ERP information were greater than when a low 
ERP was presented and also greater when a high ERP was presented. Those under time 















variances are typically quite high in studies of this type (voluntary payments with no 
upper limit), it is possible that larger cell sizes are required to observe the predicted 
effect.   Another possible reason for the lack of support demonstrated for dual 
processing effects is that System 2 processing was not effectively induced.  It would be 
beneficial for future research to utilize a context that is more suited for System 2 
processing such as an actual purchase decision.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The findings from studies 1-4 provide partial support for the argument that 
individuals using System 2 (vs. 1) processing will pay lower amounts. Because the results 
reported here are mixed, it is clear that more research is necessary to better understand 
this complex relationship. Study 1 demonstrated that individuals who are induced to think 
more about the cost and value of a service tended to pay less than those who determined 
payments without such a cognitive investment. To further support the idea that System 1 
processing leads to greater voluntary payments, study 2 results indicate that a higher 
cognitive load (that encourages more superficial cognitive processing) elicits increased 
payments. Study 3 tested whether those elaborating on consumer motivations (vs. those 
who did not) would pay less. Such an effect was not observed. Although not supporting 
the hypothesis, it is important to point out that elaboration also did not lead to increased 
payments. A final study attempted to manipulate processing via a time constraint and to 
test for differences related to heuristic based decision making. Although the pattern of 
payments indicated higher payments amounts and increased heuristic based decision 
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making under time pressure, it did not reach significance. It may be that System 2 
processing is difficult to induce in hypothetical lab contexts. It appears probable that 
System 1 processing does lead to higher payments, but it may not be the case that System 
2 necessarily reduces payment amounts. Another possibility is that System 2 processing 
is less likely to be engaged in a hypothetical context.  
 Although it is tempting to attribute higher payment amounts in PWYW settings to 
justice motivations, no evidence for this process was found. Only a dispositional trait for 
fairness included in study 3 was positively related to fairness concerns as a motive for 
voluntary payments. This may be because consumers do not care about being fair when a 
product or service is offered by a for-profit business. Perhaps the findings would be 
different in a donation or non-profit context. This idea is supported by the fact that 
regardless of amounts paid, participants tended to rate paying a fair amount as moderately 
important. This means that regardless of paying a lot (could be considered fair to the 
firm) or a little (might be considered fair to the individual), participants agreed they were 
at least somewhat concerned with fairness. It just did not motivate them to pay more. 
Fairness is a subjective and idiosyncratic concept. It is possible that when participants 
report wanting to pay a fair price, it means “fair” to them rather than what a company 
might think is fair based on the service received.  
 All studies support the hypothesis that consumers will make voluntary payments 
greater than zero on average even in anonymous settings. PWYW may be an effective 
pricing strategy under certain conditions. Based on the findings of these studies, 
providing external reference prices and encouraging consumers to think deeply about 
how much they will voluntarily pay must be approached with caution. Because larger, 
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more expensive products inherently encourage greater cognitive processing, PWYW may 
be best suited for less expensive products/services. Appealing to fairness motives seems 
unlikely to result in higher payment amounts. Further, as studies reported here 
demonstrate decision making biases, these effects may not hold if PWYW strategies 
become more mainstream. As consumers become more familiar with PWYW purchases 
and therefore experience less uncertainty, it is less likely that the biases leading to higher 
payments will be relied on. For this reason, it is important to continue to research this 
















 The eight studies presented in essays 1 and 2 address research questions focused 
on consumer decision making regarding voluntary payments in anonymous Pay-What-
You-Want pricing contexts. Findings suggest several important implications for 
practitioners and provide contributions to extant literature in participative pricing and 
consumer decision making. As a whole, the dissertation supports the notion that PWYW 
in the absence of social pressure can be a feasible and successful business strategy under 
certain conditions. Further, the research herein suggests that voluntary payment amounts 
in anonymous PWYW demonstrate the influence of heuristic-based decision making.   
In sum, this research demonstrates that consumers will voluntarily pay for 
products and services in anonymous Pay-What-You-Want pricing contexts. All 
conditions in all studies yielded mean voluntary payments greater than zero across a 
range of different products in online purchase contexts. Additionally, the presence and 
meaning of numeric information in the exchange setting were shown to influence 
voluntary payment amounts. Studies 1-3 in essay 1 demonstrated that higher numerical 
values influenced voluntary payments through anchoring effects. Study 3 indicated that 
when numeric information is high (vs. low), descriptive norm information is more 
predictive of payments than injunctive norm information. The final study in essay 1 
indicated that numeric information that is recalled by the consumer also influences 
voluntary payment amounts. Estimates of the price of the service, as well as its perceived 
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value, were each predictive of voluntary payment amounts and both also suppressed the 
influence of externally provided injunctive norm information.  
Essay 2 explored the effects of cognitive processing type utilized in the decision 
making process and found counterintuitive effects on voluntary payments. Although 
firms tend to make statements in the purchase context meant to encourage fairness in 
voluntary payment determination, results from essay 2 indicate that payment decisions 
made with more superficial processing tend to be higher. Studies 1 and 2 suggest that 
payments made under System 1 processing are higher than those made with more 
effortful System 2 processing. An elaboration manipulation in study 3 did not fully 
support the notion that elaboration (System 2 processing) reduces payments. However, it 
should be noted that those who elaborated on why consumers might pay higher amounts 
in PWYW contexts did not subsequently make higher payments. Similarly, those in study 
4 who were delayed in making payments did not make higher payments compared to 
either those deciding quickly or those who were unconstrained. The hypothesis that 
consumers rely on a “normal price” heuristic to inform voluntary payments under System 
1 processing was supported in essay 2.  
Based on the findings from these essays, there are several key “best practices” 
that emerge for firms considering anonymous PWYW pricing strategies. First, consumers 
are likely to pay more than zero on average even in the absence of social pressure. This 
makes PWYW potentially viable for online contexts. Voluntary payments in anonymous 
PWYW contexts are due to both self-impression management and the normal price 
heuristic (i.e., people expect to pay something in exchange for a product or service). 
Because heuristic based decision making is more likely in situations high in uncertainty, 
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PWYW strategies might be particularly feasible now because the strategy is currently 
novel and unfamiliar to most consumers. The normal price heuristic stems from 
consumers’ default of payment and the more familiar this sort of pricing becomes, the 
less likely consumers are to rely on the normal price heuristic. Future research should 
explore repeated purchases made under PWYW to test whether consumer familiarity with 
PWYW might lead to lower payments.   
The type of product offered under PWYW is also likely to influence the overall 
financial success of implementing this pricing strategy. Products with low variable cost 
and potentially high volume are best suited for PWYW from a cost structure standpoint. 
The risk reducing elements of digital products and services are present in all stimuli 
tested in this dissertation. Also, as demonstrated by higher percentage payments in low 
anchor conditions, less expensive items may be particularly well suited for PWYW 
pricing. When offering expensive products under PWYW, the temptation to act in a 
selfish manner and the likelihood of engaging in System 2 processing is greatly 
increased. Further, this research suggests that products such as a concert ticket or an 
album that are related to creative content are more likely to result in higher payments.. 
For example, in study 2 participants paid more than the suggested amount in all 
conditions for concert tickets. This pattern was not observed with CLOUDX, a more 
traditional product devoid of personal connection. It seems that a personal connection to 
the band or artist may enhance the salience of self-impression management. Qualitative 
responses for music-related products often mentioned the band “deserved” to be paid a 
fair amount and/or that the participant wanted to “support” the band. This was not the 
case when the firm was selling software. Future research exploring product type 
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differences as well as the role of brand loyalty/love is necessary to further explore these 
initial findings.  
The findings also provide guidance on PWYW implementation on a tactical level. 
Should firms provide numeric information in PWYW exchanges? If so, what type of 
numbers and how large should they be? Further, is it in a firm’s best interest to encourage 
a consumer to make a “fair” payment? The research suggests that providing information 
about what others are paying influences voluntary payment amounts. Therefore, such 
information should only be provided if sufficiently high. Also, when providing injunctive 
norm information (suggested prices, normal prices, etc.) it is important to provide 
numerical values that are high, but not too high. Injunctive numeric information has 
diminishing returns when extremely high and also could result in reactance and lower 
payments. Results from control conditions suggest that providing any numeric 
information at all may reduce payments by suppressing the heuristic effect associated 
with a normal price. This suggests that firms should therefore refrain from providing 
numeric information of any kind. Importantly, there is no evidence that encouraging 
fairness will result in higher payments, and preliminary evidence reported in this 
dissertation suggests that it may actually reduce payments. Firms should be very careful 
about attempting to appeal to fairness motives in PWYW contexts. Lastly, based on the 
possibility of a novelty effect, PWYW might be most successful when used as a 
temporary promotion strategy rather than a long term approach. 
Beyond practical implications, the research also contributes to our understanding 
of consumer behavior. The eight studies reported here extend findings on voluntary 
payments in PWYW pricing contexts to those made in anonymous purchase contexts. 
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Most existing PWYW research has explored tangible product contexts where exchange 
occurs in a face-to-face setting.  Such settings would therefore be subject to social-
impression management.  In spite of numerous real-world business examples, previous 
researchers have suggested that anonymous contexts are not feasible to study PWYW 
effects (Kim et al. 2009). The data reported herein indicates otherwise. It is important for 
future research to test these findings in a field setting with consumers. Further, findings 
suggest that voluntary payments are influenced by numeric and normative information. 
Supporting prior consumer behavior research, it is demonstrated in this dissertation that 
consumers are both highly influenced by numeric information and motivated to behave in 
a manner similar to others. Finally, voluntary payments also seem affected by type of 
cognitive processing.  The dissertation’s results suggest that rather than making payments 
motivated by fairness or self-interest, consumers in PWYW contexts are more likely to 
rely on heuristic based decision making.  
Across two essays, results provide insight into consumer decision making 
regarding voluntary payments in the novel context of anonymous PWYW pricing. Strong 
evidence is demonstrated for the influence of heuristic based decision making. Findings 
in turn support prior literature as well as demonstrate counterintuitive findings. Several 
new research questions have emerged, encouraging continued study in this area.  








ESSAY 1 STUDY 1: MATERIALS 
 
A1. CLOUDX Attitude Scale 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
1. CLOUDX is useful 
2. CLOUDX is beneficial  
3. CLOUDX is something someone like me would buy.  
4. CLOUDX is unnecessary (reverse coded) 
5. CLOUDX would make my life easier.  
Items presented in a randomized order and measured on a 7 point Likert from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree (higher numbers indicate more positive attitudes).  
 
A2. Attention Check Quiz 
Just to make sure that you understand the CLOUDX service, which of the following is 
NOT something that CLOUDX offers in its monthly contract? 
1. 100 GB of storage 
2. Sharing capabilities 
3. Advanced graphic design software (correct response) 




























ESSAY 1 STUDY 2: MATERIALS 
 
B1. Frequency of Attending a Concert Item 
Please indicate how frequently you attend concerts: 
1. Have never attended a concert 
2. Less than once a year 
3. Once a year 
4. 2-3 times a year 
5. Once a month 
6. 2-3 times a month 
7. Once a week or more 
 
B2. Purchase Manner Item 
If you were to buy a ticket to a concert in advance (NOT the night of the show), how 
would you most likely buy that ticket? 
1. Calling the venue on the phone and speaking with a person 
2. Calling the venue on the phone and using an automated system 
3. Buying it online through the venue’s website or a ticketing website 
4. Going to the venue and paying for it in person 
5. Other (Please explain) 
Items 1-4 presented in a randomized order 
 
 
B3. Likelihood of Attendance Item 
If you heard that one of your very favorite bands or musicians was playing soon in 
Eugene on a date that you would be able to attend, how likely would you be to attend the 
concert? 
1. Very Unlikely 
2. Unlikely  
3. Somewhat Unlikely 
4. Undecided 
5. Somewhat Likely  
6. Likely 
7. Extremely Likely  
 
B4. Willingness-To-Pay for Concert Tickets Items 
1. How much do you expect to pay for a concert ticket to see your favorite musician or 
band? 
Please answer in dollars and cents. 
2. How much is the most you would pay for a concert ticket to see your favorite band? 
Please answer in dollars and cents 
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3. How much do you expect to pay for a concert ticket for a popular nationally known 
musician or band? 
Please answer in dollars and cents 
 
B5. Screenshots of Payment Page 
a. Control Condition: 
 
 











c. Low Descriptive Condition (arrow added for emphasis): 
 
 
B6. Importance of Factors in Price Determination Items 
When deciding how much to pay, how important were thoughts regarding: 
1. Your own personal financial situation 
2. The cost to the venue of putting on the show 
3. Giving myself a good deal 
4. Paying a “fair” amount 
5. How much it was worth to you 
6. How much you think the venue might normally charge for a service like this 
Items presented in a randomized order and measured on a 7 point Likert from “Not 
important at all” to “Most important factor in determining price I paid” (higher numbers 
indicate greater importance).  
 
B7. Cognitive Effort Level Items 
Please tell us how accurate the following statements are regarding how you selected the 
price to pay for the ticket: 
1. I just went with my gut feelings (Reverse-coded) 
2. I decided very quickly (reverse-coded) 
3. I considered several factors when deciding what to pay 
4. I thought a lot about how much to pay 
Items presented in a randomized order and measured on a 7 point Likert from “Strongly 












ESSAY 1 STUDY 3: SCREENSHOTS OF PAYMENT PAGE 
 
C1. Screenshots of Payment Page (arrows added here for emphasis) 
a. Control (No Payment Constraint) Condition 
 




















ESSAY 2 STUDY 1: MATERIALS 
 
D1. Fairness Priming Task 
In this short study, we are interested in students' feelings about tickets for sporting events. 
A (different) University is considering changing the way they distribute football tickets 
for post-season and championship games. We would like to get your input on three 
options that are currently under consideration.  
We are especially interested in the FAIRNESS of each option. Please read and consider 
the following options: 
#1: The University would distribute the tickets in a lottery system where interested 
students could enter their names to be randomly selected.  
  
#2: The University would distribute the tickets in a first-come-first-served system where 
interested students could line up at the ticket booth in advance.  
  
#3: The University would distribute the tickets in an auction system, where the highest 
bidders would buy the tickets.  
Please comment on which option is the most fair and which is the least fair in your 
opinion. Take your time and provide several reasons WHY your choice is the most fair 
and compare and contrast the choices. 
 
D2. Control Priming Task 
In this short study, we are interested in students’ feelings about their workload and how 
they balance social, scholastic and work commitments. A (different) University is 
considering making scheduling (class time) changes in order to help students better 
balance their commitments.  
We are especially interested in how much time per week you spend on class work and 
how BUSY or NOT BUSY you feel.  
Please think carefully about each of the following: 
#1: All the commitments you currently have related to school (such as attending class, 
homework, studying, etc.) and how much time per week you spend on each.   
#2: All the work-related commitments you currently may have and how much time per 
week you spend on each. 
#3. All the extracurricular commitments that you currently have that are non-school and 
non-work related (such as volunteer, social activities or hobbies) and how much time per 
week you spend on each. 
Please comment briefly on which area takes up the most of your time per week and which 
takes least of your time.  
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Take your time here and provide several reasons WHY one area demands more time and 
compare and contrast the areas 
D3. High IRP Condition Manipulation 
Based on the above information about CLOUDX, how much do you think the company 
would charge per month for CLOUDX service?  
(Please enter dollars and cents in numerical form) 
 
D4. Low IRP Condition Manipulation 
Based on the above information about CLOUDX, how much do you feel that the 
CLOUDX service IS WORTH to you personally per month?  
(Please enter dollars and cents in numerical form) 
 
D5. Factors Considered in Price Determination Item 
Please list the thoughts or factors that you feel influenced the price you decided to pay for 
CLOUDX (in order of importance). 
Please list at least two thoughts / factors. 
Participants were given 5 open-response boxes: 
1. Most important 
2. Next important 
3. Also considered 
4. Also considered 
5. Also considered 
On the next screen, their responses were presented to them and they were asked: 
Now, we’d like you to please report whether each of the thoughts you listed was positive, 

























ESSAY 2 STUDY 2: MATERIALS 
 
E1. Price Fairness Item 
How do you feel about the price of CLOUDX ($9.99 per month)? 
Measured on a 7 point bipolar scale from “a very unfair price” to “a very fair price.” 
Higher numbers indicate more perceived fairness.  
 
E2. Price Perception Scale 
The price of CLOUDX: 
1. is very inexpensive, is very expensive   
2. hurts a little, hurts a lot 
3. is very low cost, is very high cost 
Items presented in a randomized order and measured on a 7 point bipolar scale (higher 
numbers indicate more perceived expense).  
E3. Cognitive Load Manipulation 
In this study, we are interested in measuring the memory skills and abilities of students at 
the University of Oregon to compare to other colleges. 
 
In order to do this, you will be shown a randomly generated string of letters for 20 
seconds, then you will complete a separate study which should take you less than 5 
minutes to complete. 
 
After completing the unrelated study, you will be asked to report the string of letters you 
were shown (in the same order) and we will be testing for accuracy. 
(page break) 
In order to ensure our measurement of your memory skill is as accurate as possible, 
please try your hardest to remember the number. 
 
One method that helps to remember things for short periods of time is to repeat the letters 
over and over in your head until you are asked to provide it again. 
(page break) 
Remember, it is important to try to remember the letters as best you can so that we can 
have an accurate measurement for UO. 
 
You will be asked to report the letters at the completion of the next segment, in 
approximately 5 minutes. 
 
After you click the forward button, the randomly generated letters will be displayed for 
20 seconds then you will be automatically advanced to the next study. 
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E4. PWYW Description (same as previous studies) 
The company that makes CLOUDX is considering offering this service under a Pick 
Your Price strategy, which allows customers to completely set their own prices for 
products. This means that you are able to select any price that you are willing to pay and 
you will receive the service, regardless of the amount that you select, from zero to a 
theoretically infinite amount.  
E5. Opting In / Out 
Would You: 
1. Opt to buy and continue on to select your price? 
2. Decide not to purchase CLOUDX and leave the site? 
 
E6. Opted Out Items 
The following questions concern why you decided NOT to pick your price and purchase 
CLOUDX. 
1. Regarding the product, how interested were you in CLOUDX service? 
Measured on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from “not interested at all” to “very 
interested.” 
 
2. Which option best describes why you decided to not to pick your price and purchase 
CLOUDX?  
1. I didn’t want the product for any price. 
2. I was unsure of how much to pay so I just opted not to buy. 
3. I was confused. 
4. I actually wanted to buy it (pressed the wrong button) 
5. I felt bad about paying as little as I wanted to.  
6. Other (please fill in).  
Items 1-5 were presented in a randomized order with item 6 always presented last. If 
“other” was selected, participants were asked to fill in an open-ended response. 
 
3. What is your BEST GUESS of the average price that people report paying for 
CLOUDX when allowed to pick a price? 
(Open-ended response) 
 
4. Please report any additional information that you would like to share about CLOUDX 












E7. Manipulation Check Items 
1. How difficult was it for you to remember the letters? 
Measured on a 7 point Likert scale from “very easy” to “very difficult” 
2. How much effort does it take to try to memorize and remember a string of letters of 
this length?  
Measured on a 7 point bipolar scale from “no effort” to “extremely hard” 
 
3. How much effort did YOU PERSONALLY to try to memorize and remember the 
letters? 







































ESSAY 2 STUDY 3: MATERIALS 
 
F1. Belief in a Just World Scale Items 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
1. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have. 
2. I feel that a person's efforts are noticed and rewarded. 
3. I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get. 
4. I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves. 
5. I feel that people get what they deserve. 
6. I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given. 
7. I basically feel that the world is a fair place.  
Items are presented in a randomized order and responses are on a 7 pt Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”  
F2. System 1 Condition Instructions 
The company would like you to decide how much to pay as quickly as possible.  
 
When you get to the payment screen, please go with your first instinct and enter your 
payment as fast as you can. 
 
F3. Elaboration Manipulation Detail 
Before you decide how much you want to pay for CLOUDX, please take a few minutes 
to think about and respond to the following question: 
[INSERT P.O.V. MANIPUATION HERE]*. [INSERT ELABORATION 
MANIPULATION HERE].** 
You have AT LEAST 2 minutes to think about and write down the reasons or factors. 
Please take as long as you would like, but you won’t be able to advance the page for at 
least two minutes. 
Please write down as many reasons as you can come up with during this time. 
[Participants will be given a large essay style text box to respond and the page is held for 
two minutes. After two minutes, they are able to advance when they have completed their 
answers.]  
*P.O.V. Manipulations: 
Self: Please pretend you are about to buy this service.  
Firm: Please put yourself in the position of the company. If you worked for CLOUDX, 
**Elaboration Manipulation 
Undirected: What are some of the things (you, a consumer) would think about in deciding 
how much to pay? 
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Justice: What are some reasons why (you, a customer) might pay a fair price? 
















































ESSAY 2 STUDY 4: MATERIALS 
 
G1. Screenshots of Payment Page (all images are control ERP level) 
 
a. Control (No Time Restraint) Condition  
 
 


















c. System 2 Processing (Time Delay)  
 
G2. Manipulation Check Items 
1. How rushed did you feel in deciding how much to pay for CLOUDX? 
Measured on a 7 pt bipolar scale from “extremely rushed” to “not rushed at all” 
 
2. Did the company give you a suggested amount to pay for CLOUDX? Yes/no 
[If yes is selected then] 3. How much did the company suggest you pay? (open-ended 
response)  
4. Have you ever bought a product or service where you were allowed to completely 
determine your own price in real life? Yes/no 
[If yes is selected then] 5. Please tell us about the product. What was it and how much did 
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